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Abstract
Developing countries are characterized by high rates of mortality and morbidity. A potential contributing
factor is the low utilization of health systems, stemming from the low perceived quality of care deliv-
ered by health personnel. This factor may be especially critical during crises, when individuals choose
whether to cooperate with response efforts and frontline health personnel. We experimentally examine
efforts aimed at improving health worker performance in the context of the 2014–15 West African Ebola
crisis. Roughly two years before the outbreak in Sierra Leone, we randomly assigned two accountability
interventions to government-run health clinics — one focused on community monitoring and the other
gave status awards to clinic staff. We find that over the medium run, prior to the Ebola crisis, both inter-
ventions led to improvements in utilization of clinics and patient satisfaction with the health system. In
addition, child health outcomes improved substantially in the catchment areas of community monitoring
clinics. During the crisis, the interventions also led to higher reported Ebola cases, as well as lower mor-
tality from Ebola — particularly in areas with community monitoring clinics. We explore three potential
mechanisms: the interventions (1) increased the likelihood that patients reported Ebola symptoms and
sought care; (2) unintentionally increased Ebola incidence; or (3) improved surveillance efforts. We find
evidence consistent with the first: by building trust and confidence in health workers, and improving the
perceived quality of care provided by clinics prior to the outbreak, the interventions encouraged patients
to report and receive treatment. Our results suggest that accountability interventions not only have the
power to improve health systems during normal times, but can additionally make health systems resilient
to crises that may emerge over the longer run.
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1. Introduction
Over 8 million people die annually in low- and middle-income countries from treatable conditions. In
addition to the human suffering, in 2015 these preventable deaths generated USD 6 trillion in economic
losses (Kruk et al. 2018). These deaths are particularly tragic because care is often available at little to no
cost, but there is under-utilization of available health services (Dupas 2011). Low quality of care is thought
to be a major factor responsible for low utilization (Banerjee et al. 2004; Das et al. 2016). More than half of
patients surveyed by the Lancet Global Health Commission across 12 countries report that they did not seek
necessary medical care in the preceding year, because they lacked confidence in their local health system
(Kruk et al. 2018, e1211).
This point has been underscored by the recent intractable Ebola outbreaks — in West Africa from
2014–2016, and in the Democratic Republic of Congo since 2018. In September 2014, the World Health
Organization (WHO) described West Africa’s Ebola epidemic as “the most severe acute public health emer-
gency seen in modern times. Never before in recorded history has a biosafety level four pathogen infected
so many people, so quickly, over such a broad geographic area, for so long” (WHO 2014). At that point,
less than 7,000 individuals had been infected. By the end of the crisis in early 2016, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) estimated more than 28,000 confirmed, suspected, or probable cases (CDC
2019). Sierra Leone, one of the three most heavily impacted countries, accounts for roughly half of those
cases and just under 4,000 deaths.
As with other infectious diseases, Ebola containment efforts emphasize early isolation and treatment.
Ebola spreads through the transmission of infected bodily fluids; reducing the reproduction rate, thus, re-
quires “reducing the time between when people first show symptoms and are isolated” (Whitty et al. 2014,
193).1 Yet, fears about sub-standard care and a lack of trust in health workers and the health system deterred
symptomatic patients from visiting clinics: “Local communities were suspicious of efforts to test, treat, and
isolate patients with Ebola symptoms and engaged in practices of hiding sick family members, running away
from local communities, or attempting to manage the course of Ebola within local households and commu-
nities” (Abramowitz et al. 2016, 24). Thus, low utilization of health services, reflecting a lack of confidence
in the quality of care, is thought to have been a major obstacle to early treatment and containment of the
Ebola epidemic in West Africa. This is not specific to Ebola: public confidence in health systems affects
efforts to contain other epidemics, including the novel coronavirus (COVID-19).
What can be done to improve confidence in health workers, and the perceived quality of care of health
1 Seeking treatment not only prevents transmission, but also increases the patient’s survival prospects: Garske et al. (2017, 5)
report case fatality rates of over 90 percent for patients in Sierra Leone with no or unknown hospitalization status, but that rate
drops to less than 60 percent for patients admitted to Ebola treatment units or holding centers in Sierra Leone (see also Waxman
et al. 2017).
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systems, to make them more resilient to crises? The Lancet Global Health Commission focuses attention on
two groups: patients — who must be “accountability agents, able to hold health system actors to account”
— and providers: “Demotivated providers cannot contribute to a high-quality health system. . . [Resilience]
requires accountable leaders who respect and motivate their frontline staff” (Kruk et al. 2018, e1200).
These recommendations echo claims in personnel economics about how to motivate difficult-to-monitor
frontline workers (Finan et al. 2017). While the principal-agent model makes clear how financial incentives
can induce effort, performance pay may not always be feasible under resource constraints. Moreover, if
frontline health workers perceive intrinsic benefits from their work, financial rewards may crowd out in-
trinsic motivation (Benabou and Tirole 2003; Besley and Ghatak 2005; Dixit et al. 2002). Fortunately,
non-financial approaches to motivating workers also exist. Organizations can harness social incentives that
arise from interactions between providers and clients, or among providers themselves (Besley and Ghatak
2005; Ashraf and Bandiera 2018). For example, competition can be engendered among health workers
as an alternate route for improving effort. Empowering citizens with monitoring tools to hold providers
accountable can serve as another lever (Mansuri and Rao 2003).
We evaluate these two ideas using a field experiment implemented just before the Ebola outbreak in
Sierra Leone.2 In partnership with the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) and 3 international NGOs, we
randomly assigned two interventions (and control) to 254 government-run health clinics.3 The timing of the
experiment relative to the Ebola epidemic affords us a unique opportunity to measure the effects of these
interventions under business-as-usual and crisis conditions. Unlike past studies, we can observe whether
the interventions contribute to the health system’s resilience — a capacity to respond to crises and changing
population needs that we observe only when a system faces an adverse shock.
The first intervention promotes social accountability, providing patients with the information and forum
to confront frontline health providers. Modeled on a program evaluated by Björkman and Svensson (2009),
the community monitoring (CM) intervention creates scorecards ranking local health services; convenes
interface meetings with community members and clinic staff to discuss these ratings and to develop “joint
action plans” to improve service delivery; and follows up with meetings to monitor progress after 1, 3, and
9 months. The second intervention motivates clinic staff through a competition that provides non-financial
awards (NFA) to the best and most improved clinic in each district. The competition is advertised to clinic
staff, who are also revisited three times during implementation to sustain interest. The winners receive
a letter of commendation from a high-ranking politician and a plaque or wall clock for the clinic. The
interventions do not provide physical inputs to clinics; rather, they attempt to empower patients to demand,
and motivate nurses to supply, higher quality care despite resource constraints.
2 Endline surveying for our evaluation concluded in June 2013; the first Ebola case was reported in May 2014 (see Figure 2).
3 The interventions were funded by the World Bank and implemented by Concern Worldwide, the International Rescue Com-
mittee, and Plan International with support from GoSL’s Decentralization Secretariat and the Ministry of Health and Sanitation.
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We leverage this experimental design and original data from 5,080 households, 508 community leaders,
and 254 clinics to estimate the causal effects of these interventions on both medium-run outcomes measured
one year later, as well as their longer run effects on reporting during the Ebola crisis. The clinics in our
study cover nearly 1 million people, just over 15 percent of Sierra Leone’s population in 2011.
In the medium-run, prior to the crisis, we find that both interventions improve the perceived quality of
care and confidence in the health system, as reflected in individuals’ satisfaction with health workers and
their increased utilization of clinics. Facing a health need, individuals living in treatment areas are 7 percent
more likely to seek care in a government-run clinic; and satisfaction increases by 0.1 standard deviations.
These effects are similar across both the CM and NFA arms. In CM alone, we find increases in maternal
utilization — for example, the probability of delivery in a facility increases by 11 percent — as well as
improvements in child health outcomes. The likelihood of under-5 death in the household declines by 38
percent, which we attribute to maternal utilization, as well as increases in vaccinations and improvements
in child weight-for length. These effects are similar in magnitude to Björkman and Svensson (2009), who
find a 33 percent reduction in under-5 mortality in clinics subject to community monitoring in Uganda. In
our experimental context, neither intervention changes the quantity of services provided, nor leads to greater
resources at the clinic level. This is not surprising, as the interventions do not attempt to increase inputs to
clinics from higher levels of government.
To examine longer-run effects on outcomes related to the Ebola crisis, we use a de-identified database
maintained by the GoSL and CDC. We count the number of reported cases (including individuals who test
negative for Ebola) in a given week and section — a small administrative unit with a median area of 40
square kilometers.4 Pooling the treatments, we estimate that the interventions increased total reported cases
substantially, by just over 60 percent. While both treatments generate sizable increases, and we cannot reject
the null that the treatments have equivalent effects, we see a larger increase in total reported cases in CM
(above 70 percent). While most cases test negative for Ebola, the interventions also increase the number
of infected patients reporting: a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the effects on reporting by
infected individuals reduces the disease’s reproduction rate (R0) by around 19 percent (Pronyk et al. 2016).
We find no evidence that geographic spillovers, i.e. the movement of patients from control to treatment
sections, amplify these effects.
Analogous to our medium-run effects, improvements in health outcomes during the Ebola crisis con-
centrate in areas receiving the CM intervention. Among patients who report, we find that a smaller number
die in treated sections: our results imply that 1 patient dies for every 7 that reported in treated sections in the
current or last week; that worsens to 1 in every 4 in control. This difference is driven by sections with CM
4 The 254 clinics in the full sample fall in 205 sections. 160 sections contain a single clinic and, thus, have a unique treatment
status and common dosage. We use this as our primary sample in analyzing Ebola-related outcomes; yet, we find similar effects
with a dose-response model that employs the full sample of 205 sections (see Table E.11).
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clinics.
We attribute the effects on Ebola reporting to improved perceptions in the quality of care and greater
trust and confidence in the government health system. The medium-run effects on satisfaction and utilization
are also present in the subset of clinics used in our Ebola analysis. Moreover, we find that individuals in
both treatments express greater confidence in western medicine in our endline survey relative to traditional
and spiritual healers, the principal alternatives to government clinics in rural Sierra Leone. We combine
our measures of utilization, satisfaction with public health workers, and the relative efficacy of western
medicine, into a perceived quality of care index. Instrumenting that index with our treatment, we find that
a one standard deviation change in the perceived quality of care increases total reported cases by 0.43 per
section-week.
We do not find support for two alternative explanations. First, the interventions do not appear to have
increased actual Ebola transmission. We find that all types of cases, including patients with both confirmed
and negative test results, increase in sections with treated clinics. As a consequence, the ratio of confirmed
to total cases does not change with treatment. To rule out contagion within clinics, we investigate whether
confirmed cases test positive due to exposure that may have occurred upon reporting (e.g., through contact
in a waiting room). We can rule out such nosocomial transmission (i.e., exposure originating in a clinical
setting) in 99 percent of cases, based on the timing symptom onset and reporting. Second, we also do not
find that sections with treated clinics have more resources for top-down surveillance: sections with treated
clinics do not host more facilities specializing in Ebola care, and there are no differences in laboratory testing
or case workers. If anything, we find that a higher proportion of confirmed cases undergo contact tracing
(i.e., the process of identifying recent contacts to flag at-risk individuals) in sections with control clinics.
Our results highlight two important points. First, accountability interventions can improve health sys-
tems and health outcomes by increasing the perceived quality of care, and by building trust and confidence
in health providers. Second, perceived quality of care and confidence in the health system may become
especially important during crises, when individuals face a choice about whether to cooperate with response
efforts, such as heeding an evacuation order, honoring a quarantine, or voluntarily reporting for medical
testing. Experts argue that low confidence in health systems undermines efforts to contain the current out-
break of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19), which has already infected over 95,000 individuals globally.5
In addition, trust in government has been shown to be correlated with the decision to utilize care during the
Ebola crises of Liberia (Blair et al. 2017; Morse et al. 2016; Tsai et al. 2019) and the DRC (Vinck et al.
2019) — claims which mirror recent evidence showing that fear and distrust deter patients from utilizing
5 Wen (2020) writes, “A robust response [to COVID-19] from medical and public health practitioners has already begun. But
for any response to be effective, people need to heed government officials’ orders, and for that, they must have faith that their
leaders know what they’re doing and have the citizens’ best interests at heart.” In China, fears of under-reporting have led officials
to adopt intrusive monitoring strategies (Mozur 2020) and begin offering large cash payments to patients who report, with one city
reportedly offering over 1,400 USD to a patient who later tests positive (Bostock 2020).
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health systems (Alsan and Wanamaker 2017; Blair et al. 2017; Vinck et al. 2019; Lowes and Montero 2018).
As such, accountability interventions may confer particularly large benefits during crisis conditions, through
their effects on reporting and cooperation, which can help reduce mortality and the spread of an epidemic.
To the best of our knowledge, we present the first experimental evidence showing this potential benefit,
by demonstrating how accountability interventions can improve improve perceptions of the health system,
increase epidemic reporting, and lower mortality conditional on reporting during a crisis. In this regard,
our findings shed light on how accountability interventions can make health systems more resilient to major
disruptions such as a health crisis.6 Other evaluations of social accountability programs may miss this
potential benefit given the infrequency of crises events.
More broadly, our findings bear on a larger literature on how to increase accountability among frontline
bureaucrats and improve public services. The effects we observe do not align with net crowd-out of intrinsic
motivation. Instead, they are consistent with previous work suggesting that social incentives such as non-
financial awards can be used to boost worker performance in mission-oriented settings (Ashraf et al. 2014),
as well as other experimental settings (Kosfeld and Neckermann 2011) and the private sector (Markham
et al. 2002). Empowering citizens through community monitoring has also been examined as a tool for
improving service delivery in a variety of social sectors, including education (Banerjee et al. 2010; Pradhan
et al. 2011; Barr et al. 2012; Andrabi et al. 2018), corruption (Fiala and Premand 2018; Olken 2007) and
health. As discussed above, our results align closely with Björkman and Svensson (2009), but are further
from the more recent work of Raffler et al. (2019) who also examine community monitoring of health clinics
in Uganda, but find weak effects. A possible reason for these contrasting results may lie in the baseline
health conditions under which the interventions were implemented. The Björkman and Svensson (2009)
intervention was implemented in 2004-2005, when under-5 mortality in Uganda stood at 117 per 1,000
live births. Analogously, our accountability interventions in Sierra Leone were implemented when under-5
mortality stood at 149.8 per 1,000 live births. In contrast, the more recent study in Uganda implemented
community monitoring over 2014-2016, when infant mortality had fallen to 59 per 1,000 live births. The
lack of consistent effects in the latter context suggest that it may be more difficult to improve health outcomes
when baseline conditions themselves have already improved substantially (Raffler et al. 2019).7
The interventions we analyze harness social accountability and competition between providers to im-
prove interactions between providers and the communities they serve. Other related approaches to improv-
ing health service delivery have examined the effects of financial incentives (Miller et al. 2012; Olken et al.
2014; Singh and Mitra 2017); combined technological monitoring with financial incentives (Banerjee et al.
6 Relatedly, Bandiera et al. (2019) find that an empowerment program for young women in Sierra Leone increases their capacity
to cope with disruptions caused by the Ebola crisis.
7 When implemented under challenging baseline conditions, the effects of community monitoring appear to persist. A follow-up
study of the original Björkman and Svensson (2009) intervention suggests a lack of convergence in health outcomes up to four years
later (Björkman Nyqvist et al. 2017).
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2008); and leveraged social incentives among patients, for example, through social signaling (Karing 2019).
Our paper is also related to a larger literature that examines various approaches to improving health out-
comes in the developing world. A complete review of this literature can be found in Dupas (2011) and
Dupas and Miguel (2017).
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design and details
of the two interventions. Section 3 introduces our sampling procedure, the survey and Ebola case data, ran-
domization and empirical strategy. Section 4 presents our medium-run findings and plausible mechanisms,
longer run Ebola outcomes, and investigates alternative explanations. The final section concludes with a
discussion of policy implications.
2. Healthcare in Sierra Leone
2.1 Background
According to the World Development Indicators, Sierra Leone had the second highest under-5 mortality rate
in the world in 2011, with 149.8 deaths per 1,000 live births. In the same year, the country had the highest
maternal mortality rate in the world. Figure A.2 displays Sierra Leone’s per capita health expenditure and
under-5 mortality in 2010 relative to other countries that the World Bank classified as low income. Located
in the upper-right quadrant, the country spent more and performed worse than countries at a comparable
level of economic development.
In an effort to reduce infant and maternal mortality, the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) launched
a free health care initiative in 2010, removing fees for pregnant women and children under 5 years old. The
policy simultaneously increased pay for government healthcare workers; at the time 30–50 percent of staff
did not receive a government wage and instead relied on charging illegal fees or inflated drug prices and
accepting in-kind contributions from the communities they served. In addition to removing cost barriers and
severe resource constraints, the GoSL saw a need to strengthen incentives for front-line healthcare workers.
Absent incentives tied to service delivery, the government worried that nurses would miss work or continue
to charge illegal fees — barriers to care that the free healthcare initiative was intended to eliminate.
Government-run clinics and hospitals are the primary providers of western-style medicine in Sierra
Leone; private and NGO-sponsored facilities are scant (Denney and Mallett 2014). These facilities operate
alongside traditional birth attendants and healers. Government clinics, referred to as peripheral health units
(PHUs), come in three types: maternal and child health posts (MCHPs), community health posts (CHPs),
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and community health centers (CHCs). The MCHPs and CHPs that comprise our study sample are primary
health facilities — the first points of contact for patients in towns and villages — that each service popula-
tions of 500 to 10,000 (UNICEF 2014, 5). The 192 MCHPs and 62 CHPs included in our study covered a
population close to 1 million people, nearly 15 percent of the country’s population of 6.6 million in 2011.
PHUs continued to operate during the Ebola crisis: a UNICEF (2014, 17) facility survey in October
2014 (four months after the first confirmed case in Sierra Leone) found that only 4 percent of PHUs were
closed. Levy et al. (2015, 753) report that “early assessments [from October 2014] found that many [Ebola]
patients were first seeking care at local PHUs.” Concerned that these PHUs lacked the training and equip-
ment to properly isolate and care for Ebola patients, PHU staff were rapidly trained on infection prevention
and control and outfitted with personal protective equipment. By early December 2014, 81 percent of health-
care workers in Sierra Leone had received training (see Table E.2); by early January, training had reached 98
percent (Levy et al. 2015). In addition to screening and providing “no-touch” treatment for dehydration and
fever, a case study in Kenema District found that PHU staff (specifically, community health workers) were
also engaged in social mobilization, contact tracing, and community-based surveillance (Vandi et al. 2017).
While training and the disbursement of protective equipment filled important knowledge and resource gaps,
UNICEF’s (2014, 17) survey found that 90 percent of PHUs felt that fear and misconceptions were “the
main challenge confronted by the health system in fighting Ebola.”
2.2 Interventions
2.2.1 Community Monitoring
We model our Community Monitoring (CM) intervention on Björkman and Svensson’s (2009) “Power to
the People” intervention, which was implemented in Uganda in 2005. The intervention attempts to mobilize
“client power,” empowering patients with the information and forum to demand accountability from frontline
staff (The World Bank 2003). CM convenes users and providers to discuss problems around local health
service delivery and agree upon actions both groups can take to address these problems.
The CM intervention follows a four-step protocol. First, trained facilitators convene meetings with
clinic staff and share scorecards rating local health problems. The scorecard includes five indicators related
to maternal and child health (maternal mortality, under-5 mortality, vaccination rate, percentage of births in a
health facility, and completion of four antenatal visits). These are constructed from relevant questions in the
baseline household survey, and are compared to the district average so as to prompt discussion. Clinic staff
are then invited to share their concerns and frustrations with the community. For example, nurses frequently
complained that community members do not utilize the clinic, that mothers choose not to give birth in the
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clinic, and that parents fail to complete the vaccination course for children.
Second, facilitators convene a meeting of community members excluding the clinic staff, and use the
same five indicators to prompt discussion, along with three additional indicators related to user experiences
(charging of illegal fees, nurse absenteeism, and staff attitude). Community members are then invited to
raise concerns about health outcomes and services. Common complaints include rude behavior from staff
and nurses not taking the time to listen carefully to patients’ concerns.
Third, interface meetings bring together community members and clinic staff. Facilitators guide a
discussion, in which both sides have the opportunity to articulate the complaints and concerns raised in the
earlier meetings. The facilitators then assist in the formulation of a “joint action plan” that specifies actions
that the clinic staff and community members will take to address issues with health service delivery. For
each component of the joint action plan, facilitators work with both sides to specify a time-frame and assign
a responsible “point person”; meetings conclude with the signing of the compact by community and clinic
representatives.8 Several of the most common problems cited in the joint action plans relate to utilization,
and the actions that users and providers jointly agree to target this outcome. For example, health facility staff
are charged with encouraging institutional deliveries, referring and escorting community members to health
facilities, discouraging the use of “quacks,” and handling patients with a “good attitude.” The community
agrees to encourage use of clinic services and seek prompt and early treatment. After the meeting, NGOs
leave a copy of the compact with the clinic and representatives from each village.
Finally, facilitators held follow-up meetings 1, 3, and 9 months after the initial inter-face meeting to
monitor progress on the joint action plans. These meetings included both community members and clinic
staff. At the three-month follow-up, the average meeting size is only slightly lower than attendance at the
first inter-face meetings.
2.2.2 Non-financial Awards
The Non-financial Awards (NFA) intervention promotes competition among clinics. Clinics in the NFA arm
compete to be the best or most-improved clinic in their district; with 85 NFA clinics spread across 4 districts,
just under 10 percent of clinics receive an award.9
8 The research team randomly selected and monitored half of these initial inter-face meetings. (The other half of clinics in CM
were monitored at the three-month follow-up meeting, as noted below.) We find that the vast majority of facilitators adhered to
meeting protocols: meetings typically lasted 3–4 hours; the average meeting ranged from 51.9 people in Kenema district to 68.2 in
Bombali district and included representatives from the clinic, traditional authorities, and a larger number of community members
(with roughly equal representation of men and women).
9 The average clinic has just over two staff members; this small size ameliorates free-riding problems that might otherwise arise
in a competition that awards clinic-wide outcomes, rather than individual effort.
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We rank clinics at baseline and endline, using baseline data collected at clinics and from households
residing in a catchment area around clinics. Key performance indicators include measures of utilization for
ante-natal care, childbirth, and vaccinations; as well as measures related to users’ experiences, including
absenteeism, staff attitude, and charging fees for services that should be free. Importantly, we do not reveal
these indicators publicly to avoid having staff reallocate their effort toward these tasks at the expense of
other important tasks.
Although staff do not know what indicators are used in the ranking, we also worry that competing
clinics might manipulate their records to exaggerate their performance. To encourage truthful reporting,
we inform all clinics (not just those in NFA) that we will audit their registers at baseline and endline and
disqualify clinics with fraudulent entries. Each audit involved randomly selecting 30 patients from the clinic
register (corresponding to 15 patients per study community) and then visiting these individuals to verify
their recorded visit date and purpose. None of the audits uncovered ghost patients or manipulated entries in
the clinic register.10
In the NFA arm, the competition is announced and extensively advertised at the clinic. As in the
CM intervention protocol, facilitators revisit clinics three additional times during the intervention to sustain
interest in the competition. Awards are given to the best and the most-improved clinics in each district, with
winners announced after the endline survey concludes. Winning clinics receive a plaque or wall clock to
display inside the clinic at a public ceremony.
The awards are “non-financial” from the government’s perspective, as that they do not involve any
monetary compensation. Yet, workers may associate winning with a longer-term financial payoff. For
example, workers may have anticipated that being on staff at a wining clinic would facilitate promotions or
transfers to attractive locations. We are agnostic about which element of the award, recognition or potential
future gains, motivated workers; our aim is to test whether it had any discernible effects on health outcomes
or users’ experiences.
10 All 254 clinics were told they would be audited at baseline and endline. At baseline, the audit was conducted for all clinics, and
clinic staff were also reminded that it would be repeated following the endline survey. During endline we sampled clinic registers to
conduct the audits from clinics in all study clinics; however, to reduce data collection costs, we only verified patient details for NFA
clinics. The lack of verification in CM and control clinics cannot differentially affect reporting, since the endline data is collected
under the common expectation that every clinic will be audited and prior to when endline verification occurred.
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3. Design and Methods
3.1 Sampling
3.1.1 Full Sample
We worked in four districts (Bombali, Tonkolili, Bo, and Kenema) that bisect Sierra Leone from north to
south (see Figure A.1(a)). These districts include 319 government-run clinics (PHUs) that provide primary
and maternal care. We sampled 254 of these clinics, such that all sampled clinics were separated by at
least 3 kilometers to minimize spillovers. As a result, the average distance to the next nearest clinic is 10
kilometers. Moreover, in Sierra Leone, residents are “assigned” to clinics (i.e., told by government what
clinics to use), which discourages use of more distant clinics. At baseline, the average clinic in our sample
had just over 2 staff members present, reported being open 6 days per week, and saw roughly 450 outpatients
in the month prior to the survey. Over 80 percent of clinics had walls and roofs in good condition, accessed
piped or protected water, and had stocks of basic medications (e.g., oral re-hydration salts and antibiotics);
yet, only 10 percent had functional electrical lighting.
We then randomly sample two communities from the catchment area of each clinic (defined as a 3.2
kilometer buffer around the clinic). This generates a sample of 508 communities. At baseline, we randomly
sampled 5 households in each of these communities for an extensive household survey (2,540 households).
We also randomly sampled an additional 15 individuals in each village and administered a shorter user-
feedback survey focused on recent health episodes, service provision, and satisfaction. At endline, we
re-surveyed the 5 households that took the baseline household survey. We also randomly selected 5 of
the 15 individuals who took the user-feedback survey at baseline and administered the endline household
survey, which was revised to incorporate modules from the user-feedback survey. This generates a sample
of 10 households per community at endline (5,080 households). The households in our sample are poor: at
baseline, 74 percent live in homes with mud floors and wooden walls; 24 percent have no toilet facility and
another 58 percent use a pit latrine; only 20 percent own a mobile phone; and 62 percent have no formal
education.
3.1.2 Ebola Sub-Sample
Our data on Ebola cases are aggregated to the section-week. Sections are the smallest administrative units
in Sierra Leone: the median section is under 40 square kilometers and had fewer than 2,500 residents in the
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2004 census (see Figure A.1(c) for a map of section boundaries).11
The 254 clinics in the full sample fall into 205 sections. Figure 1(b) maps all sections included in the
study with those include in the Ebola sub-sample in dark grey. Of the 205 sections, 45 sections include
multiple clinics. In our primary analysis we restrict attention to the 160 sections that contain a single clinic
and, thus, a unique treatment assignment. Of the 160, we retain 54 control sections, 46 CM, and 60 NFA.
As a robustness check, we also analyze the data using a dose-response model, which uses the proportion of
clinics in each section that receive either treatment (see Table E.11).
3.2 Data Collection
3.2.1 Survey Data on Health Clinics, Health Services and Health Outcomes
Baseline data collection took place in September 2011; endline surveys, in May and June of 2013 (see Fig-
ure 2 for a timeline). We rely on three survey instruments: first, surveys at each clinic, in which enumerators
audited the staffing, cleanliness, drug stocks, and registers of clinics; second, surveys of leaders of each
village regarding amenities, relations with the clinic, and community development; and third, household
surveys which captured health and economic outcomes and health-seeking behavior among other outcomes.
We filed an analysis plan for the survey data at the AEA RCT registry on March 2017.12 The analy-
sis plan defines ten outcome families: (1) general utilization, (2) maternal utilization, (3) health outcomes,
(4) satisfaction, (5) health service delivery, (6) clinic quality, (7) community development and political en-
gagement, (8) contributions to clinics, (9) water and sanitation, and (10) economic outcomes. The sub-
components comprising each outcome family were specified in the analysis plan and are listed in Ap-
pendix D.2.
Each outcome family represents a set of variables aggregated using control group-standardized indices
per Kling et al. (2007). To create an index of K outcomes, we first reverse outcomes where necessary such
that a higher value indicates better outcomes. We then compute y˜i =
1
K
K
∑
(
yik−µ0k
σ0k
)
, where µ0k and σ0k
11 Our decision to aggregate cases to the section-level stems from two features of our geocoding procedure (see Section E.22).
First, many villages in Sierra Leone do not have recorded names; when patients report their residences, they tend to name better-
known towns, rather than their village or hamlet. As relevant administrative units, sections typically feature a central or headquarter
town. Using a larger administrative unit, we avoid measurement error that arises from attributing patients to larger towns that
actually occur in the surrounding villages. Second, our geocoding procedure matches residences to lists of geolocated placenames.
When we use smaller geographic units, these often contain few placenames that we can match patients’ residences to: 85 percent of
census enumeration areas (which are just 7 square kilometers on average) contain one or zero placenames. By contrast, the average
section contains 8 geolocated placenames; 94 percent of sections contain more than 1 placename.
12 AEARCTR-0002085: https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2085.
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are the estimated control-group mean and standard deviation for outcome k in family K. Our estimates for
these families represent standard deviation changes relative to the control group.
Following Kling et al. (2007), in case yik is missing but another sub-component of the family is mea-
sured, we impute the mean from the same treatment arm and survey wave. Some sub-components, e.g.,
those that relate to childbirth, are only defined for a fraction of respondents. As such, we do not impute
values when estimating treatment effects for individual sub-components. To demonstrate the imputation is
innocuous when looking at effects on families, we follow Kling et al. (2004) and Casey et al. (2012) and ag-
gregate treatment effects across the sub-components of each family using seemingly-unrelated regressions
(SUR). These results (reported in Appendix Section D.2 generate nearly identical inferences.
Below we describe each family; Appendix Section B.1 provides additional detail on each family’s
constituent outcomes.
1. General utilization measures the number of episodes in which individuals seek care at a western clinic,
including in response to four of the most common health needs relevant for primary health units — childbirth
in the past year, antenatal or postnatal care, vaccination, or any illness or injury in the past month — as well
as a residual category of any other type of consultation in the past month. The residual category helps
generate a comprehensive measure of utilization; we note, however, that regular health check-ups are not
common in our setting, so nearly all utilization occurs in response to specific health needs. Utilization
of western clinics reflects the decision to seek care at western-style medical facility (overwhelmingly at a
government-run clinic given the lack of NGO-run or private clinics), rather than visiting a traditional healer
or spiritual leader or avoiding any type of care.
2. Maternal utilization is measured among women who gave birth in the year before the endline survey.
The family includes two outcomes: an index of the number of times a woman sought antenatal care (ANC)
or postnatal care (PNC), and an indicator for whether the woman gave birth in a western-style medical
facility.13
3. Health outcomes are measured at the household-level. The family includes four measures related to
child health: under-5 mortality over the past six months; under-5 illnesses over the past month (e.g., malaria
or diarrhea); under-2 vaccine completion; and under-5 child wasting, measured using the weight-for-length
ratio.14 The family also includes three other variables: two related to childbirth, maternal mortality over
the last six months and problems faced by the mother or newborn within two months of delivery; and one
13 Some outcomes within families are themselves indices. Throughout we use the control-group standardized indices described
above (Kling et al. 2007).
14 We collected data on upper-arm circumference. However, inspection of this variable reveals implausible values due to devi-
ations from our survey protocol: some enumerators wrongly recorded measurements in inches; others, as directed, in centimeters.
We cannot discern with certainty which units apply to many observations and, thus, rely on child weight-for-length to measure
wasting.
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indicator related to general health, whether any household member reports an illness or injury.
4. Satisfaction is measured at the household-level. The family includes three outcomes measured on a
four-point Likert scale from “Very Unsatisfied” to “Very Satistfied”: the respondent’s satisfaction with their
family’s health; satisfaction with public health workers (i.e., clinic staff); and, among households with at
least one member utilizing a western-style clinic in the last year (approximately half), satisfaction with the
care they received.15 Among these households with members utilizing the clinic in the last year, we ask
whether they would return to the clinic for a future medical need. The last two satisfaction outcomes are
asked across the different types of health episodes, so we average responses across individuals in a household
when multiple episodes are reported.
5. Clinic quality includes three clinic-level outcomes. First, we construct an index of clinic service provi-
sion that aggregates measures related to organization (e.g., medicines sorted by expiration date and stored
in a safe location), the types and frequency of services offered (e.g., family planning), number of staff on
duty, and hours clinics are open. Second, we measure the proportion of staff who are aware of the 2010
policy that removed user fees for maternal and under-5 services. Finally, we measure employee satisfaction.
The services offered and employee satisfaction are reported in the clinic survey; other measures are based
on enumerators’ observations.
6. Health service delivery is measured among individuals who experience a health episode in the month
before the endline survey (for childbirth episodes recall is over the past six months). The family includes
outcomes derived from the household survey, including staff absenteeism and wait times, problems with
clinic facilities or staff, satisfaction with services, staff attitude, drug availability, and fees paid. Per our
analysis plan, two satisfaction outcomes appear in this family and the satisfaction family (measured at the
individual- and household-level respectively). We verify that this redundancy does not affect our family-
level result for health service delivery.
7. Contributions to clinics is measured at the community-level. The family includes two outcomes. The
first outcome, derived from the survey of village leaders, captures whether the community convened meet-
ings about the clinic and whether it contributed labor to the upkeep of the clinic or well-being of staff (e.g.,
helping to plant a garden for nurses). The second outcome incorporates responses from clinic staff about
whether the community made such contributions or had disputes with clinic staff.
8. Community development and political engagement (CDPE) is measured at the community-level. The
family includes outcomes related to community members’ participation in meetings in the last six months,
contributions to local development projects over the last year, their self-reported ability to address problems
collectively over the last year, and turnout for the local and national elections in November 2012.
15 As with general utilization, satisfaction with care is asked of individuals who attend the clinic for childbirth in the past year,
antenatal or postnatal care, vaccination, any illness or injury in the past month or any other type of consultation in the past month.
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9. Water and sanitation is measured at the household-level and includes three outcomes: an index that
tracks households’ access to potable water and toilet facilities; an index that measures public water and
toilet facilities in each community; and an index of questions related to households’ satisfaction (measured
on the four-point Likert scale) with water, sanitation, and cleanliness in their community.
10. Economic outcomes is measured at the household-level and comprises four outcomes: indices of phys-
ical assets, agricultural assets (e.g., livestock, farm tools), and dwelling materials; as well as an index cap-
turing total consumption expenditure over the last month.
Families 1–4 (general utilization, maternal utilization, health outcomes, and satisfaction) convey the
main effects and mechanisms for our medium-run results. Families 5–8 (clinic quality, health service de-
livery, contributions to clinic, and CDPE) represent other plausible but unsupported mechanisms. Finally,
families 9 and 10 (water and sanitation and economic outcomes) are additional outcomes presented in the
appendix.
3.2.2 Ebola Case Data
We rely on the Epi Info Viral Hemorrhagic Fever (VHF) database, which was the primary data management
system used for case and contact tracing during the outbreak. The Ministry of Health and Sanitation, with
support from the CDC implemented and maintained the VHF database through the end of the epidemic, and
McNamara et al. (2016, 39) describe it as “the most comprehensive epidemiologic and laboratory data on
Ebola cases available in Sierra Leone.” As noted above, the VHF cannot be used to measure the underly-
ing incidence of Ebola; rather, it reflects reported cases — a particularly important outcome for stopping
contagion and containing the epidemic (Enserink 2014).
We use a de-identified version of the VHF database (where patient names and characteristics have been
redacted).16 While the data were compiled at the National Ebola Response Center in Freetown, data entry
occurred at the district-level. Surveillance officers employed (even prior to the crisis) by the Ministry of
Health and Sanitation (MoHS) oversaw teams of case investigators charged with following up on suspected
cases. Investigators learned about cases from communities, phone calls, active surveillance (e.g., contact
tracing), and through walk-ins at health centers (Owada et al. 2016, 2). For each suspected case, they
completed a case investigation form (CIF), which included demographic (including district, chiefdom, and
village) and health information. A copy of the CIF accompanied blood samples or swabs from corpses, so
that lab results could be linked back to cases to confirm or rule out an infection (McNamara et al. 2016, 37).
Completed CIFs were brought back to District Ebola Response Centers and entered by data managers in the
16 The Njala University Ebola Museum and Archive facilitated access to this database.
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local VHF database. Each observation in our data represents one of these CIFs. Data from the districts were
periodically transmitted to the National Ebola Response Center.
The VHF database includes four different types of cases. Two classifications result from testing: neg-
ative cases where Ebola has been ruled out; and confirmed cases per lab results. In total, the VHF contains
data on 8358 confirmed cases. The average patient (reported in Fang et al. (2016)) was 30 years old; and
over 70% were above the age of 18. There are two residual categories that are never confirmed with lab tests:
suspected cases display Ebola symptoms and/or have had contact with potentially infected individuals or
animals;17 and probable cases meet the criteria for a suspected case and were either screened by a clinician
or died and have an epidemiological link to a confirmed case. Given our interest in reporting, our primary
outcome is total cases — the sum across these four case types.
We geocode cases using information on individuals’ residences included in the VHF database (typi-
cally, district, chiefdom, and village or parish). The full geocoding protocol is described in Section E.22.
While this geocoding process introduces measurement error, we expect this to be uncorrelated with our ran-
domized treatments and, if anything, result in a loss of efficiency. Consistent with this claim, we test whether
treated sections have more or longer placenames, or placenames that are more likely to contain spaces (i.e.,
two word names), and find no substantial or significant differences (see Table E.27). To check the accuracy
of our geocoding protocol, we look at the average number of confirmed cases in sections that hosted major
Ebola-specific treatment facilities: Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs), Ebola Holding Centers (EHCs), or Com-
munity Care Centers (CCCs). We find that sections with ETUs, the largest facilities, reported 484 cases on
average; sections without any of the three facilities averaged just 25.2 total cases (see Table E.1).
Our main dependent variable is the count of total cases aggregated to the section-week. We use the
date when a case is first entered in the VHF database to determine the week. To demonstrate robustness, we
employ a number of alternative specifications, using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the count
and the logged count, as well as estimating linear probability and Poisson models (see Tables 3 and E.8).
17 Suspected cases include (1) the onset of high fever and contact with a suspected, probable, or confirmed individual or a dead or
sick animal; (2) the onset of high fever and at least three of the following symptoms: headaches, vomiting, anorexia/loss of appetite,
diarrhea, lethargy, stomach pain, aching muscles or joints, difficulty swallowing, breathing difficulties, or hiccup; any person with
inexplicable bleeding; or any sudden, inexplicable death. Suspected and probable cases may have died prior to a lab sample being
collected; alternatively, administrative issues may have led to tests being missed or not entered into the VHF.
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Figure 1: Mapping of Ebola Cases and Sample
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Figure 1(a): the number of entries (logged) by section in the Viral Hemorrhagic Fever (VHF) database maintained
by the CDC during the Ebola crisis. Figure 1(b): map of all sections that contain clinics that were part of the original
randomized experiment. Sections in light gray are excluded, because they contain more than one clinic from the original
RCT.
3.3 Randomization
3.3.1 Matching and Blocking
We grouped the 254 clinics in our sample into matched triplets. Clinics in a triplet fall within the same
district and exhibit similar levels of utilization and performance at baseline.18 Within each triplet, we then
randomize clinics into control, community monitoring (CM), or non-financial awards (NFA). This results
in 84 clinics assigned to control, 85 to CM, and 85 to NFA. Figure 2 illustrates this allocation of treatment
and the timing of randomization relative to data collection. We include matched-triplet fixed effects in our
reduced-form specifications to account for the blocked randomization.
18 We exactly match clinics by district and type (MCHP or CHP) and then select matches based on the Mahalanobis distance
between eight indicators specified by the Ministry of Health: completion of first-year vaccinations, institutional deliveries, com-
pletion of fourth antenatal care visit, charging of fees for maternal and under-5 services, nurse absenteeism, staff attitude, maternal
mortality, and under-5 mortality.
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Figure 2: Consort Diagram
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Figure 2: the samples and timing associated baseline and endline surveys, the randomization, and the Ebola crisis. An
initial end to the outbreak was declared in November 2015; however, a few additional cases emerged and the country
was finally deemed “Ebola free” in March 2016.
3.4 Integrity of the Experiment
Table C.1 reports balance across pre-specified covariates. Most notably, we find that the number of injuries
or illnesses reported is lower in both treatment arms relative to control, household size is slightly smaller,
and there are fewer households reporting a recent childbirth in CM. If anything, we expect such imbalances
make it harder to find effects on general and maternal utilization. We also find that NFA communities have
better cell phone coverage and a higher level of educational attainment, are less likely to belong to the
Temne ethic group and are less likely to believe what a doctor told them. As a robustness check, we include
unbalanced variables at baseline as additional controls.
We report manipulation checks in Tables C.2 and C.3 based on survey responses. Over 85 percent of
CM communities report a meeting held by one of our implementing partners to discuss working with the
clinic to improve health service delivery; the average CM community reports 2.5 such meetings. Around
44 percent of control communities report meetings as well. This does not reflect non-compliance by our
implementing partners; rather, community meetings unrelated to our interventions are not uncommon across
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these districts and were likely to have been mistaken for interface meetings. Nearly 95 percent of staff in
NFA clinics have heard of the NFA intervention; conditional on knowing about the program, 84 percent
report participating compared to 48 percent among control villages. Staff in CM and control clinics also
appear to have heard about the NFA program, albeit at lower rates. Conditional on having heard about NFA,
13 of 84 control clinics report participating. Again, this likely reflects misperception and not implementation
failures or contamination: control clinics cannot opt into the NFA competition, which requires the research
team to rank each participating clinic. Moreover, the research staff did not detect any deviations from
treatment assignment when monitoring implementation of the NFA treatment.19 If clinic staff in control
clinics are motivated by the mistaken belief that they are eligible for an award, this would attenuate our
treatment effects.
3.5 Specifications
3.5.1 Survey Outcomes
The analysis plan specifies outcome variables, the construction of indices, and the specifications we estimate;
and we flag and explain any subsequent deviations in Appendix Section B.1.
Our baseline survey included a smaller sample of households. Moreover, some outcomes are only
defined for individuals who recently experienced health episodes. Some households that experienced health
episodes at endline may not have also experienced episodes during baseline. For both reasons, controlling
for a household’s baseline outcome would reduce the size and representativeness of our sample. We instead
employ an ANCOVA-type model that controls for the village-level average at baseline, estimating:
yivc,EL = αb+βCM1(CM)c+βNFA1(NFA)c+δY vc,BL+ εivc,EL (1)
where yivc,EL is the outcome of household (or individual) i in village v in clinic catchment c at endline (EL).
(Models for community-level outcomes omit the i subscript.) αb represents the matched-triplet fixed effects.
Treatment status, which is randomized across clinics, is denoted by the indicator variables 1(CM)c and
1(NFA)c. Y vc,BL is the village-level average at baseline. When y is a sub-component of an outcome family,
we still use the family-level outcome to compute this baseline average.20 We cluster our standard errors on
clinic, the unit of randomization. We also estimate a variant of Equation 1 in which we pool the CM and
19 The NFA treatment involved 4 rounds of meetings. During the second round, we randomly selected half of all clinics and sent
an enumerator to monitor the meeting.
20 This decision is motivated by two features of our data: first, some sub-components are only measured at endline; second, for
some sub-components and villages we have no data to compute the average (e.g., if there were no recent births). To improve preci-
sion through the inclusion of a prognostic pre-treatment covariate, we include the average family-level outcome. This represents a
slight deviation from the analysis plan, but does not affect affect any of our conclusions.
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NFA treatments into one pooled treatment indicator.
When analyzing data at the clinic-level, we drop the indexes for households and villages, estimating:
yc,EL = αb+βCM1(CM)c+βNFA1(NFA)c+δY c,BL+ εc,EL (2)
These models include a single observations for each clinic, so there is no need to cluster our standard errors.
In addition to conventional standard errors, we report q-values that control for the proportion of incor-
rectly rejected null hypotheses (Anderson 2008). Specifically, we control for the false discovery rate within
treatment arm (1) across outcome families; and (2) across sub-components within each family.21
As noted above, we follow Kling et al. (2007) to construct outcome families for the medium-run results.
If an individual only has data for some sub-components within a family, this procedure involves imputing
those missing sub-components using the mean from that individual’s treatment arm. This leads to high
rates of imputation when a family includes sub-components that are not well-defined for a large share of
observations (e.g., complications with childbirth can only be measured for mothers). To confirm that such
imputation does not influence our results, we follow Kling et al. (2007) and Casey et al. (2012) and employ
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). In short, we estimate treatment effects on each sub-component of
a family without any imputation and then average the coefficients across these stacked regressions, using
the delta method to compute standard errors. The tables in Appendix Section D.2 include results for our
pre-specified families using SUR, as well as the results from the stacked sub-component regressions.
3.5.2 Ebola Case Data
We assess the impact of the CM and NFA interventions on reported cases for the 160 sections in the Ebola
sample (described in Section 3.1.2). We observe counts of reported cases in each section in every week from
10 August 2014 to 18 October 2015. However, we restrict attention to the period from September through
April 2015, when Ebola transmission was a real threat in our study area; less than 1 percent of confirmed
cases (3 in total) occur in the seven months between May and October 2015.22
21 In the analysis plan, we specified controlling for the false discovery rate (FDR) only across some families denoted primary
families and within those families, only across some outcomes. However, since we examine all outcomes, and several key to our
overall account (e.g., satisfaction) were designated such that they would not have been accounted for in the FDR adjustment, we
deviate from the analysis plan in the conservative direction by instead, correcting across all outcome families, and within each
family, across all composite outcomes.
22 In Table E.9 we extend the panel back to August 2014 and replicate our primary results from Table 3.
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Using this data, we estimate:
yst = αb+δt + γCM1(CM)s+ γNFA1(NFA)s+ηst (3)
where αb again represents the matched-triplet fixed effects; δt are week fixed effects; s ∈ {1,2, . . . ,160}
indexes sections; and t ∈ {1,2, . . . ,34} indexes weeks. For panel models, we cluster our standard errors at
the section-level, which in the Ebola sample coincides with the clinic, the level of randomization.23
We amend Equation 3 to detect spillovers within our study sample — namely, the reallocation of
patients from control to treated sections (or vice versa). Specifically, we interact our treatment indicators
with covariates that, in the presence of such spillovers, should moderate our treatment effects (e.g., distance
between sections, connections via roads).
4. Results
4.1 Medium-term Outcomes
We present the main medium-run survey results in Table 1, which shows estimated effects on clinic utiliza-
tion, health outcomes, and patient satisfaction.24 Our tables follow a common format. Column 1 provides
the control mean and standard deviation, which are zero and one exactly when looking at family-level mean-
effects indices. Column 2 presents the average treatment effect (in standard-deviation units) when pooling
the treatment arms in a comparison with control. Columns 3 and 4 separately estimate the average treatment
effects for CM and NFA, respectively. Column 5 shows the difference between the average treatment effect
in CM and NFA. Column 6 provides the F-test for the joint null hypothesis of no effect from either treatment.
Finally, Column 7 gives the sample size used for each regression.
Table 1 shows uniformly positive treatment effects across families for CM. Specifically, the general
utilization of clinics increases by 0.11 standard deviation units when we pool the treatments, and the separate
effects are similar for CM and NFA. Individuals in the control group recently used a western clinic for
23 When we collapse the data over time and estimate cross-sectional models, we omit the week fixed effects and t subscripts. As
treatment assignment occurs below the section-level, we do not cluster our standard errors in the cross-sectional models.
24 To gauge how individual indicators contribute to our family-level effects, Appendix Tables D.1–D.10 present treatment effects
for each of the individual indicators. Tables D.11–D.19 repeat these analyses using the z-scored (i.e., control group-standardized)
versions of the indicators. As discussed above, our primary approach to aggregating across individual indicators is to construct
families of outcomes (i.e., mean-effects indices) per Kling et al. (2007). As a robustness check, we also use SUR to average
treatment effects across indicators, and the results from this approach are presented in the top rows of the tables in Appendix
Section D. Overall, our results are very similar using either method of aggregation; some coefficients attenuate under SUR, notably
satisfaction and CDPE.
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close to one (0.96) health episode (see Table D.1); the treatments increase utilization by about 5 percentage
points.25
Maternal utilization — the use of clinics for ante-natal care, birthing, and post-natal visits — can only
be measured among the 888 women who gave birth in the year preceding the endline survey. In this sample,
we find that maternal utilization increases by 0.18 standard deviation units in CM, but there is no equivalent
effect for NFA (or when we pool the treatments). As shown in Appendix Table D.2, increased maternal
utilization in CM is driven by more deliveries at western-style medical facilities: the probability of giving
birth in a western facility is 0.83 in control areas; CM boosts this rate by 0.09 percentage points, an 11
percent increase.
The health outcomes family also increases by 0.15 standard deviation units with CM. To a large extent
this is driven by significant improvements in child health. As shown in Table D.3, the likelihood that a child
under 5 dies in CM falls by 0.015 relative to the control mean of 0.039 — a 38.4 percent effect. In addition,
child weight-for-length increases by 0.16 z-score and is significant at the 10% level, though this individual
indicator loses significance after FDR adjustments. It is worth noting that the magnitude of these effects
are qualitatively similar to those uncovered by Björkman and Svensson (2009) in their study of community
monitoring in Uganda. Finally, the effect size for vaccine completion is also large, corresponding to a 10
percent increase in vaccine completion, though the indicator does not reach significance at conventional
levels.
25 Our utilization measure includes the use of private or NGO-run clinics, in addition to the government-run clinics (PHUs)
targeted by the treatments. These non-governmental providers constitute a small share of utilization (3 percent). When we focus
attention on the utilization of just government-run clinics in Table D.21, our treatment effects increase to 7.3 and 6 percent for CM
and NFA respectively, verifying that the interventions boosted utilization in the targeted clinics.
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Table 1: Utilization, Satisfaction, and Health Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA Difference
Joint
F-test (p) N
General utilization 0.000 0.112 0.126 0.099 0.026 7.054 4496
(1.000) (0.031)∗∗∗ (0.034)∗∗∗ (0.037)∗∗∗ (0.033) (0.001)∗∗∗
[0.005]∗∗∗ [0.003]∗∗∗ [0.032]∗∗
Maternal utilization 0.000 0.061 0.175 −0.043 0.218 4.128 888
(1.000) (0.064) (0.077)∗∗ (0.076) (0.081)∗∗∗ (0.017)∗∗
[0.327] [0.068]∗ [0.548]
Health outcomes 0.000 0.053 0.146 −0.037 0.184 6.318 5053
(1.000) (0.051) (0.056)∗∗∗ (0.059) (0.056)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗
[0.327] [0.045]∗∗ [0.548]
Satisfaction 0.000 0.101 0.091 0.109 −0.018 2.876 5052
(1.000) (0.042)∗∗ (0.049)∗ (0.049)∗∗ (0.048) (0.058)∗
[0.038]∗∗ [0.095]∗ [0.048]∗∗
Notes: Treatment effects are estimated using Missing-Indicator ANCOVA, controlling for the community-level average of the outcome family index at
baseline and matching-triplet fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by clinic, are shown in parentheses. Multiple-inference corrected q-values
that adjust for the false discovery rate within treatment arm are shown in square brackets. Column (5) presents an F-test for the joint significance of CM
and NFA, with the associated p-value in parentheses. Significance: * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and *** is significant
at the 1% level.
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Under CM, women use clinics more during pregnancy and childbirth, and their children’s health and
survival improves substantially. By contrast, the NFA intervention does not appear to significantly affect
either maternal utilization or health outcomes. The scorecards used in the CM intervention focus attention
on child and maternal health — these are the only metrics discussed in clinic meeting and a majority of
metrics presented at community meetings. It is possible that this emphasis leads to greater improvements
for these families in CM, as compared to NFA.
The final row of Table 1 presents impacts on patient satisfaction. Across both treatment arms, patient
satisfaction increases by about 0.10 standard deviations, largely driven by increases in respondents’ satis-
faction with their own health and health workers (see Table D.4). These effects are consistent with the idea
that the interventions led to improvements in the quality of care provided by health workers in ways that are
difficult to capture in survey measures.26 For example, improvements in quality could include the extent to
which health providers listen to patients describing symptoms, or the effort they expend on diagnosis and
selecting and explaining an appropriate plan of care, which would translate into greater satisfaction with
their performance.
The results in Table 1 show that these interventions, which were designed to make frontline health
staff more accountable to users, can generate substantial improvements in the quality of care that patients
anticipate when visiting a clinic. Both interventions increase general utilization of clinics, a behavior that
reveals would-be patients’ increased confidence in clinics, as well as patients’ reported satisfaction with
their health and with health workers.
We now turn to other families of outcomes that might help explain increased utilization and, in CM,
improved health outcomes.27 Specifically, in Table 2, we examine effects on inputs and resources available
at clinics (clinic quality), as well as the types and quantity of services provided (health service delivery).
We also examine community support for the clinic and community development and political engagement
(CDPE). A supply-side response — more resources at clinics or a larger menu of services — or groundswell
of community support could also draw would-be patients into clinics and improve their outcomes.
Yet, we do not observe effects on the resources or services available at the clinic: the clinic quality and
health service delivery families do not change significantly in response to either treatment (or jointly). This
is perhaps unsurprising given that the CM and NFA interventions do not facilitate clinics’ access to supplies
or training; the Government’s interest in the evaluation is understanding how to extract greater effort from
health workers under existing budget and logistical constraints. None of the sub-components of clinic quality
significantly improve (see Table D.5). And the coefficients are essentially zero or negative for those sub-
26 Patient-provider interactions are rarely directly observed; for a rare exception see (Das et al. 2016).
27 Spillovers do not provide a plausible explanation: our utilization measure is based on household surveys, and not clinic
registers. If our endline respondents traveled to treated clinics for care this would attenuate our medium-run results, as it would
appear to increase utilization among households living in the catchment areas of control clinics.
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components of health service delivery related to supply constraints (e.g., availability of drugs, staff not
present (see Table D.6).28 We do, however, find substantively meaningful effects on some sub-components
of health service delivery that relate to patients’ experiences. For example, we see a 59 percent reduction
in unpleasant staff behavior in NFA areas, though the effect is not statistically significant. The coefficient
for staff attitude also suggests improvements, though it loses significance after the FDR adjustments.29
While there are no significant changes in the services offered at clinics, we do see indications of more
positive interactions between patients and staff. This could help to explain the improvements in satisfaction,
particularly in NFA where we do not find changes in health outcomes.30
We also find no increase in community support: community members did not spend more time or
resources on the clinic or its staff. We do observe improvements in overall community development and
political engagement (CDPE). Yet, the sub-components driving this effect seem unlikely to affect health-
seeking behavior (see Table D.8). For example, there are no significant effects on the community coming
together to address problems collectively. Instead, the effects are largely driven by contributions to local
development projects in both CM and NFA communities and small (<0.5 percent) increases in voter turnout.
31 We also observe improvements in our water and sanitation family when we pool the treatments, driven
by NFA communities (see Appendix Table D.9).32 Finally, we find weak effects on economic outcomes
(see Appendix Table D.10), suggesting that the interventions did not materially affect households in treated
communities.
As a robustness check, we control for imbalanced baseline covariates in Table D.23. Only the effects
on community development and political engagement attenuate. Our ANCOVA specification controls for
the baseline value of each family and thus addresses the direct effects of any baseline imbalance in that
outcome.
28 We observe a positive effect of NFA on absenteeism in Table D.6. This is likely an artefact of how we specify this measure:
we ask respondents “of all the times you visited the clinic in the past month, did you ever find there were no staff present?” An
obvious drawback is that an individual who visits the clinic more frequently has more opportunities to find staff absent. Given the
treatment effects on general utilization that we report above, it seems likely that such post-treatment bias pushes towards a positive
relationship between the interventions and this measure of absenteeism. Fortunately, we also ask whether respondents found staff
absent during their last visit to the clinic. Table D.22 shows precise null effects on this outcome. This comparison suggests that the
positive effect on absenteeism in Table D.6 likely reflects increases in utilization, not rates of absenteeism.
29 There is a small (about 1.5 percent) and marginally significant increase in whether people would return to the clinic in the
future. Note, however, the ceiling effects may limit our ability to detect improvements using this measure: nearly all (97 percent)
patients in control areas report that they would return.
30 We observe null effects on health service delivery despite including the “satisfaction with care” and “would return to clinic”
variables, which are also sub-components of our satisfaction family. This reflects our original analysis plan; however, we verify that
removing these two indicators does not meaningfully alter the null effect on this family. These results are available upon request.
31 These small effects could indicate that people changed their beliefs about the government and hence, political participation.
Note that the control group turnout is already approaching the maximum at 97 percent.
32 These effects reflect greater access to mechanical wells in these communities. The greater availability of wells is consistent
with greater community participation in development projects, which would provide the labor and resources needed to put wells
into place.
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The positive effects on clinic utilization, health, and satisfaction are not driven by “top-down” improve-
ments in the supply of health services or by greater community contributions to clinics. Rather people utilize
the clinic to a greater degree, report greater satisfaction (potentially due to improvements in the quality of
service delivery such as more positive interactions with staff), and, in CM, see improvements in child health
outcomes.
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Table 2: Supply-side Measures and Community Support
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA Difference
Joint
F-test (p) N
Clinic quality 0.000 0.104 −0.004 0.213 −0.216 0.929 254
(1.000) (0.149) (0.175) (0.176) (0.184) (0.397)
[0.395] [0.649] [0.237]
Health service delivery 0.000 0.039 0.070 0.027 0.043 0.507 2877
(1.000) (0.059) (0.071) (0.062) (0.059) (0.603)
[0.395] [0.266] [0.583]
Community support 0.000 0.007 0.027 −0.013 0.040 0.062 508
(1.000) (0.095) (0.112) (0.109) (0.116) (0.940)
[0.891] [0.564] [0.619]
CDPE 0.000 0.231 0.202 0.261 −0.059 3.849 508
(1.000) (0.085)∗∗∗ (0.102)∗∗ (0.101)∗∗ (0.110) (0.023)∗∗
[0.034]∗∗ [0.095]∗ [0.032]∗∗
Notes: Treatment effects are estimated using ANCOVA, controlling for the community-level average of the outcome family index at baseline and matching-
triplet fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by clinic, are shown in parentheses. Multiple-inference corrected q-values that adjust for the false
discovery rate within treatment arm are shown in square brackets. Column (5) presents an F-test for the joint significance of CM and NFA, with the
associated p-value in parentheses. Significance: * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and *** is significant at the 1% level.
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4.2 Long-run Effects on Ebola Outcomes
Roughly one year after our endline survey, the first confirmed Ebola case was recorded in Sierra Leone. We
turn now to examining the longer-run effects that the interventions had on reporting and mortality during the
ensuing epidemic.
The treatment effects on reported Ebola cases are apparent in Figure 3: the left panel presents the sum
of total reported cases in each week by treatment arm; the right panel is the cumulative count of cases during
our study period. Between September 2014 and May 2015, we count 515 total cases in control sections; yet
in sections with clinics receiving the CM and NFA interventions 735 and 795 cases are reported, respectively.
This difference is even more striking for confirmed cases: only 21 confirmed cases are reported in the 54
control sections, while 248 are reported in the treated sections (see Figure E.2).
Figure 3: Total Cases by Treatment
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Figure 3(a) plots the time series of total cases by week; bars represent the raw counts. We use the date that the case was
first saved in the VHF. Figure 3(b) graphs the cumulative count of total cases by treatment group.
We report regression results using Equation 3 in Table 3. In the top panel, the outcomes are the raw
counts of total, confirmed, and negative cases. The pooled effect implies a 62 percent increase in the average
number of total cases. The effect is smaller and less precisely estimated for NFA (p = 0.13), which is
consistent with our medium-run results, which also show smaller effects on utilization for NFA clinics,
especially in the Ebola sample (see first row of Table 5). Nonetheless, we cannot reject the null hypothesis
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that the treatments have equivalent effects. To both improve patient survival and contain the epidemic, it
is particularly important that infected patients report. We find large increases in the average number of
confirmed cases reporting in treated sections: for every confirmed case in control, we count five confirmed
cases in treated sections.
Table 3: Reported Ebola Cases
Control Mean Pooled CM NFA Difference N
Ebola Cases
Total 0.281 0.173 0.204 0.148 0.055 5,440
(0.727) (0.084)∗∗ (0.117)∗ (0.099) (0.133)
Confirmed 0.011 0.059 0.086 0.039 0.047 5,440
(0.129) (0.024)∗∗ (0.038)∗∗ (0.025) (0.041)
Negative 0.238 0.1 0.079 0.115 -0.036 5,440
(0.648) (0.061) (0.077) (0.075) (0.093)
IHS(Ebola Cases)
Total 1.015 0.057 0.065 0.05 0.014 5,440
(0.309) (0.029)** (0.038)* (0.034) (0.044)
Confirmed 0.887 0.02 0.024 0.016 0.007 5,440
(0.064) (0.007)*** (0.01)** (0.008)** (0.012)
Negative 0.998 0.039 0.034 0.043 -0.008 5,440
(0.284) (0.023)* (0.03) (0.029) (0.035)
Notes: The sample includes 160 sections over 34 weeks. Standard errors clustered on section shown in parentheses.
Treatment effects estimated using OLS including matching-triplet and week fixed effects. Difference column reports
the difference between the CM and NFA coefficients; the standard error is computed using the delta method. The
bottom panel employs the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (IHS(y) = log(y+
√
(1+ y2)). Significance: * p <
0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.
We take a number of steps to assess robustness. First, we re-estimate our pooled effect dropping one
matched triplet at a time (Figure E.4), dropping each possible pair of matched triplets (Figure E.5), or
dropping each week (Figure E.6). Second, we estimate the effects by month to assess whether our results
are driven by a particular moment in the crisis. The pooled coefficient is positive across every month, and we
find significant effects in October, December, February and April (Table E.3). (We find large and significant
effects for CM in October 2014 and April 2015; for NFA, in October and December 2014.) The spread
of these effects across various months throughout our sample period verifies that the effects are not driven
by any particular period. Third, we conduct a placebo test where we substitute the nearest out-of-sample
neighbor for each section. We find no significant effects in Table E.12, alleviating concerns that our treated
sections are spatially clustered in areas where reporting is higher for reasons unrelated to treatment (e.g.,
exposure). Finally, we adopt a number of alternative specifications to handle our count data. In the bottom
panel of Table 3, we use the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the counts and find effects of similar
magnitude; the effect of NFA on confirmed cases becomes significant in this specification. We expand
upon this in Table E.8, which presents estimates using a linear probability model, the logged count (adding
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one to avoid dropping section-weeks with no cases), and a Poisson count model.33 In the Poisson count
model, NFA has significant effects on both confirmed and negative reported cases; the p-value for NFA
when analyzing total cases just misses a conventional threshold at 0.104.
Probable and suspected cases (which constitute 1 and 6.5 percent of total cases) are included in our
count of total reported cases. However, these cases often do not involve reporting by individuals; their
ambiguous status reflects the absence of a definitive lab test (e.g., confirmed or negative). These cases
include, for example, deceased individuals with Ebola symptoms. We separately analyze these cases in
Table E.6 and find insignificant and negligible treatment effects.34 Our results in Table 3 are driven by
increases in the number of patients that report and receive testing (see Table E.7 which subtracts probable
and suspected cases from total cases).
We next look at whether the treatments had any effect on patient deaths.35 We regress the number of
deaths in each section-week on the total number of cases reported in the current and previous week and the
interaction of that caseload with treatment. We opt for the caseload over the current and previous week,
as Ebola deaths typically occur 6 to 16 days after symptom onset. To ease interpretation, in Table 4 we
predict the number of deaths in control and treated sections for a two-week caseload of 2, 5, and 10 cases
(see Table E.4 for corresponding regression results). We find significant reductions in mortality: in control
sections, we estimate 1 patient death for every 4 cases; that drops to 1 death for every 7 cases in treated
sections — a reduction driven by CM, where there is just over 1 patient death for every 10 cases. One
may worry that patients in control simply waited longer to report and, thus, presented with a higher risk of
mortality. Yet, we show in Table E.5 that treatment does not reduce the number of days between symptom
onset and reporting. Analogous to our medium-run effects, improvements in health outcomes during the
Ebola crisis concentrate in areas receiving the CM intervention.
These conditional-on-positives estimates will be confounded if treatment changes the composition of
patients (e.g., their co-morbidities). The increased number of confirmed patients in treated sections should,
if anything, attenuate these results. Yet, despite more infected cases reporting, our findings suggest that
patients in treated sections — especially those in CM — enjoyed higher survival rates. Qualitative accounts
during the crisis suggest that trust in clinic staff encouraged patients to truthfully report their symptoms
and adhere to advice regarding treatment. Raven et al. (2018) also report that health worker morale led
to more effective care, especially when treating children.36 Consistent with the medium-run results, these
findings suggest that the accountability interventions improved the care received by patients, even under
33 We also collapse the data and estimate cross-sectional models (Table E.10). Our coefficients are of the same magnitude, but
we lose power and precision; the Poisson count models remain highly significant with only 160 observations.
34 CM has a negligible positive effect on probable and suspected cases; NFA, a negligible negative effect. The resulting difference
is small in magnitude — 9 probable and suspected cases cases spread over 106 sections and 34 weeks — but is significant at the
10-percent level.
35 Sierra Leone lacks vital statistics data, so we can only analyze mortality for cases in the VHF.
36 See https://blogs.unicef.org/blog/ebola-in-sierra-leone-the-dont-touch-rule/.
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Table 4: Patient Deaths
Total Cases in Predicted Deaths Predicted Deaths Difference
Last 2 Weeks in Control in Pooled
2 reported cases 0.49 0.36 0.13
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)∗∗
5 reported cases 1.23 0.80 0.43
(0.11) (0.17) (0.19)∗∗
10 reported cases 2.45 1.53 0.92
(0.21) (0.36) (0.40)∗∗
Notes: Standard errors clustered on section. Treatment effects estimated using OLS including matching-triplet and
week fixed effects. Predicted deaths based on estimates in Table E.4 model 1. Significance: *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and
*** p < 0.01.
crisis conditions.
4.2.1 Additional Checks within Ebola Sample
Table E.13 reports balance checks for the 160 sections in our Ebola sample. We find negligible differences
along most baseline measures relative to levels in control; the imbalance observed in the full sample carries
over to this subset. As a robustness check, we aggregate unbalanced baseline indicators to the section-level
and includes these as controls (Table E.26). In Table E.20, we also look at whether treated sections are
more exposed to the epidemic due to their proximity to index cases in Guinea or Sierra Leone or their road
density. We find that, if anything, treated sections are slightly further from index cases.
We look for evidence of spillovers between treated and control sections, particularly indications that
patients traveled from control to treated sections. Such reallocation within our sample would amplify our
treatment effects on Ebola reporting. Assuming that patients minimize travel costs, spillovers should be
largest in treated sections that border (populous) control sections. In Table E.21, we interact our treatment
indicator, first, with the number of bordering control sections and, second, with the population (based on
2004 census data) in bordering control sections. If patients from control sections report in adjacent treatment
areas, the coefficients on these interactions will be positive; yet, our estimates are negative and insignifi-
cant.37 Following a similar logic, spillovers could occur via road networks. Using data from Open Street
Map, we count how many control sections a treatment section is connected to via the road network (see
Figure E.8). Table E.23 interacts this variable with our treatment indicator and, again, finds no indication
37 We also calculate each clinic’s proximity to the next nearest control clinic in the full sample. (We do not have exact coordinates
of clinics, and thus geolocate clinics using the centroids of the census enumeration areas that contain the clinics.) In Table E.22 we
find that treated sections report more cases when their treated clinic is far from the next control clinic — the opposite of what we
would expect if spillovers are amplifying our effects.
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that treated sections connected to more controls via the road network see a larger increase in total cases.
Finally, information or people may move more easily between areas that are proximate in both geo-
graphic and cultural terms. We use the household survey to determine the plurality ethnic group in each
section. Sections tend to be homogeneous: in the median section, 95 percent of respondents report the same
ethnicity. For each section, we then count the number of control sections with the same plurality ethnic
group and within 10 kilometers. Table E.24 provides no indication that spillovers occur due to movement of
patients between proximate co-ethnic areas.
4.2.2 Mechanisms
Concerns about sub-standard care deterred patients from utilizing clinics during the Ebola crisis. Fearful
that seeking care would condemn their loved ones to death, households “engaged in practices of hiding
sick family members, running away from local communities, or attempting to manage the course of Ebola
within local households and communities” (Abramowitz et al. 2016, 24). If the CM and NFA interventions
generated persistent improvements in the perceived quality of healthcare and utilization, this would help
explain increased reporting in treated sections.38 Using our endline surveys but restricting attention to
the 160 clinics in the Ebola sample (see Table D.20 for estimates using our full sample), in Table 5 we
estimate treatment effects on general utilization; satisfaction with public health workers; and households’
beliefs about the efficacy of western (“white-man”) medicine relative to traditional or religious remedies,
the primary alternatives to government-run clinics in rural Sierra Leone. The effects on general utilization
remain positive and significant when we pool the treatments and in CM alone; the effect attenuates in the
NFA arm relative to the full sample (see Table 1). We continue to find positive effects on satisfaction,
focusing here on satisfaction with public health workers, which is asked of all households.39 Both treatment
arms generate roughly equivalent increases in satisfaction with public health workers, on the order of a
tenth of a standard deviation. Finally, we find sizable (0.3 standard deviation) improvements in households’
attitudes towards western medicine, particularly its effectiveness relative to traditional healers or spiritual
remedies. While this index is not listed among the outcomes in our analysis plan, its inclusion was motivated
by assessments of the Ebola crisis stressing the importance of trust in western medicine (e.g., Kruk et al.
2015).40
38 An alternative channel would be that improvements in physical health made people less susceptible to Ebola. However, recall
that we only find health improvements for children and not adults who comprise over 70% of the confirmed Ebola cases.
39 The satisfaction family specified in the analysis plan includes one other variable that is asked of all households at endline:
whether the household is satisfied with their family’s health. We do not analyze this variable, as contentment with health outcomes
during “normal times” seems unlikely to shape whether one seeks care following a major adverse shock like the Ebola crisis.
40 The importance of (dis)trust is tragically underscored by the violence facing western health providers responding to Ebola in
Guinea (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29256443) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/05/19/world/africa/ebola-outbreak-congo.html).
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Table 5: Perceived Quality of Care
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA Difference
Joint
F-test (p) N
General utilization 0.000 0.066 0.122 0.025 0.096 3.819 2857
(1.000) (0.038)∗ (0.046)∗∗∗ (0.041) (0.043)∗∗ (0.024)∗∗
Satisfaction with public health workers 0.000 0.145 0.140 0.149 −0.009 4.497 3149
(1.000) (0.049)∗∗∗ (0.065)∗∗ (0.053)∗∗∗ (0.065) (0.013)∗∗
Relative effectiveness of western medicine 0.000 0.293 0.340 0.257 0.084 2.867 3183
(1.000) (0.123)∗∗ (0.160)∗∗ (0.132)∗ (0.154) (0.060)∗
Notes: Treatment effects are estimated using Missing-Indicator ANCOVA, controlling for the community-level average of the outcome family index at baseline
and matching-triplet fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by clinic, are shown in parentheses. Multiple-inference corrected q-values that adjust for
the false discovery rate within treatment arm are shown in square brackets. Column (5) presents an F-test for the joint significance of CM and NFA, with the
associated p-value in parentheses. Significance: * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and *** is significant at the 1% level.
32
We aggregate the three outcomes in Table 5 into a perceived quality of care index and then instrument
this index with our pooled treatment indicator to estimate its effect on reported Ebola cases. In Table 6, we
report a large first-stage effect; the F-statistic (9.86) approaches the rule-of-thumb for a strong instrument.
When we scale our earlier reduced-form result by this first stage, we find that a one standard deviation
change in the perceived quality of care corresponds to an increase in weekly case reports of 0.43.41
Table 6: Perceived Quality of Care and Ebola Cases
First-Stage Perceived Quality of Care
Pooled (CM or NFA) 0.401
(0.128)∗∗∗
Two-Stage Least Squares Total Cases
Perceived Quality of Care 0.430
(0.249)∗
F-statistic 9.86
Observations 5,440 5,440
Notes: “Perceived Quality of Care” is an equally weighted average of the variables in Table 5. Matching-triplet fixed
effects included in both first- and second-stage regressions. Standard errors are clustered by section. Significance:
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.
As with the full sample, we do not find consistent positive effects for families focused on supply-side
variables in the Ebola sample. Pooling the treatments, we see no significant effects on health service delivery
or clinic quality (see Table E.14).42
4.3 Alternative Explanations
4.3.1 Transmission
We attribute the increase in total and confirmed cases in treated sections to reporting, not a difference in
Ebola incidence. As the true incidence of Ebola in Sierra Leone is unknown — the WHO and CDC assumed
they were missing half or more of all cases (Enserink 2014) — we use a number of indirect approaches to
support this argument.
The interventions concluded in December 2013, five months before the first Ebola case in Sierra Leone.
41 Our research design does not separately manipulate treatment status and the level of the mediator. Table 6 quantifies the effect
of quality of care on reported Ebola cases only under a strong assumption about the exclusion restriction.
42 Separating the two treatments, clinic quality increases in NFA. Unpacking the clinic quality index, the improvement does not
reflect improved conditions at the clinic (e.g., cleanliness), more staff on duty, or additional hours open; rather, the increase is driven
by an increase in the proportion of required services provided and a reduction in charges for out-of-stock medicine.
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We find similar effects on confirmed cases from the two treatments, though NFA did not involve direct out-
reach to communities. The CM intervention did include community meetings. If such gatherings continued
after the intervention and were sites of Ebola transmission, we would expect more infections in treatment
areas to originate from contact with individuals outside of the home.43 For a subset of infected patients,
caseworkers engage in contact tracing, identifying and following up with people who may have come into
contact with the infected patient. In this process, caseworkers record how these contacts relate to the patient
(e.g., neighbor, tenant, brother, grandmother). In the last two columns of Table E.16, we find that patients
subject to contact tracing report fewer contacts outside of their nuclear family (i.e., parents, children, sib-
lings) in CM and NFA relative to control; the number of contacts outside of patients’ nuclear families does
not increase with CM.
By increasing the number of individuals reporting, the treatments could have increased contact between
infected and susceptible individuals, raising the risk of nosocomial transmission.44 To address this possibil-
ity, we compare the dates of symptom onset, reporting, and lab testing. Two features of the Ebola virus are
important to note: first, Ebola incubates for 2 to 21 days (8–10 on average) before showing symptoms; and
second, an individual can only test positive after displaying symptoms. Consequently, symptom onset or
lab results in the first two days after a patient reports cannot not reflect infections due to exposure after the
patient reports. For 92 percent of confirmed cases, symptom onset occurs prior to reporting. In 99 percent
of cases (all but 2 cases), either symptom onset or laboratory testing occurs within two days of reporting,
indicating that nearly all confirmed cases we count do not result from infections that occur after the case
was reported.45
As further evidence against nosocomial transmission in our sample, Fang et al. (2016) report that
infections among healthcare workers fall precipitously by September 2014 (the start of our study period),
indicating improved awareness and infection control. We continue to find treatment effects in the months
after a nationwide effort to train healthcare workers in isolation and no-touch treatment (see Appendix
Table E.3).
Finally, we look at the ratio of confirmed to total cases across treatment and control areas to determine
whether the interventions increased the share of infected patients among total cases. This ratio is however
undefined when no cases are reported in a section-week. Below, we take a bounding approach, imputing
43 Community gatherings are unlikely sites of Ebola contagion. The virus is transmitted through direct contact with infected
bodily fluids (blood, feces, semen, spit, sweat, vomit). Funerals were sites of transmission, because participants touched infected
corpses. Unlike airborne pathogens, proximity is not sufficient to spread Ebola: Glynn et al. (2018) estimate a secondary attack rate
of only 18 percent among individuals living in the same household as a confirmed Ebola patient.
44 See also Lowes and Montero (2018) who demonstrate long-lasting unintended consequences from nosocomial transmission
in the context of historical public health campaigns in West Africa, which highlight the importance of addressing this alternative
account.
45 The proportions are nearly identical among patients who test negative for Ebola: 89.8 percent have symptom onset prior to
reporting, and 99.4 percent have onset or lab testing within 2 days of reporting.
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either all ones or all zeros to observations where the ratio is undefined. Imputing all ones assumes that,
if cases had reported, they would have all been confirmed; imputing all zeros assumes that, if cases had
reported, none would have tested positive. Figure E.9(a) plots the average ratio of confirmed to total cases
across control and treated sections. Looking at either bound, there is no meaningful difference in these
ratios, and the confidence intervals overlap throughout the study period.46
In Section E.20, we write down a model to clarify what must be assumed for our results to reflect a
change in exposure (as opposed to reporting). For confirmed cases to increase while the share of confirmed
to total to remains unchanged, one must conjecture that the treatments dramatically increased reporting
by asymptomatic individuals while having negligible effects among those showing possible signs of the
virus. This strains credulity: one cannot preemptively test for Ebola, so individuals without symptoms have
no reason to report; moreover, qualitative accounts suggest the crisis deterred unexposed individuals from
visiting clinics, even when they had other healthcare needs (Elston et al. 2016).
4.3.2 Surveillance
Surveillance is challenging in a setting like rural Sierra Leone: if individuals or families want to avoid health
workers, they are unlikely to be detected given the difficulties of canvassing sparsely populated regions with
limited road networks (Richards et al. 2015; Olu et al. 2016; McNamara et al. 2016). Nonetheless, we look
for indications of intensified top-down efforts in treated sections as a possible alternative explanation for the
increase in reported cases.
First, contact tracing is central to disease surveillance efforts. In our control sections 59 percent of
confirmed cases were subject to contact tracing, compared to just 22 percent in CM and 28 percent in NFA
(Table E.16). Second, we use three measures derived from the VHF data (all measured at the section-level):
(1) the probability that a case received laboratory testing to confirm or rule out an infection; (2) the average
number of days that passed between a case being reported and lab testing; and (3) the number of unique case
workers (logged) that entered information into the VHF. We expect these variables to proxy for top-down
surveillance efforts during the crisis. In Table E.17, we find no significant differences for these variables
across treatment and control.
Finally, using data from Sierra Leone’s National Ebola Response Center (NERC) and the UN Mission
for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), we count the number of Ebola-specific treatment facilities
in each section (see Section E.1). There were three types of specialized facilities: Ebola Treatment Units
46 It is possible that the ratio of confirmed to total cases could stay constant if there was an increase in the number of probable
and suspected cases. Figure E.9(b) repeats the bounding exercise but uses the ratio of confirmed to confirmed plus negative cases.
This exercise delivers the same conclusion, as the number of probable and suspected cases are small and unaffected by treatment
(see Table E.6.
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(ETU, 32 beds on average), Ebola Holding Centers (EHC, 18 beds on average), and Community Care
Centers (CCC, 10 beds on average). Only one ETU falls within our sample, and it is located in a control
section; Table E.18 shows no significant difference in the counts — either combined or separate — of EHCs
or CCCs.47
Our results in Table 3 are robust to dropping the small number of sections that contain one or more
of these specialized facilities: when analyzing total reported cases, the coefficient on our pooled treatment
indicator increases from 0.173 to 0.177 (se = 0.091) when we drop these sections; for confirmed cases, it
changes from 0.59 to 0.55 (se = 0.025).48
5. Conclusion
This study shows that accountability interventions, such as community monitoring and non-financial awards,
can boost the perceived quality of health care and improve health outcomes in a developing country setting
— not only during “normal” times, but also during crises. We use a randomized experiment completed
less than one year before the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone to test the effectiveness of two interventions:
one focused on community monitoring of government-run health clinics and the other on status awards
for clinic staff. In the medium term, we find that both interventions improve utilization of clinics, patient
satisfaction, and beliefs about the relative efficacy of western medicine. Similar to previous work, we
find large decreases in under-5 mortality following the community monitoring intervention (Björkman and
Svensson 2009). During the Ebola crisis, we find that both interventions substantially increased reporting
— by both patients who test positive and negative for the virus — and reduced mortality among patients.
Thus, we find evidence that accountability interventions which leverage social incentives to increase
the perceived quality of health care can lead to greater utilization of health systems in a low-resource setting,
in ways that help build their resiliency to confront crises.
We explore two alternative explanations for why the interventions increased reporting during the Ebola
crisis: by unintentionally increasing exposure to Ebola; or by enabling more top-down surveillance efforts.
We do not find support for these mechanisms. Specifically, we find no evidence to indicate that the inter-
ventions contributed to transmission at treated clinics, or that they raised the infection rate among patients
47 The absolute numbers here are instructive: there is 1 EHC in control sections, 1 in NFA sections, and 2 in CM sections. In
Figures E.4 and E.5 we drop all triplets and pairs of triplets as a robustness check to address concerns that a small number of
sections could drive our results.
48 The locating of specialized facilities in nearby sections could depress reported cases, as patients might report directly to those
facilities and, thus, not be counted within their home section. In Table E.19 we find that treated sections are not significantly further
from ETUs, EHCs or CCCs in the NERC data; the distance from NFA sections to the nearest CCCs is shorter when we use the
UNMEER data.
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(i.e., the ratio of confirmed to total cases). Rather, the interventions increased reporting by both infected in-
dividuals, as well as those who feared they had been exposed but tested negative. We also see no indication
of more Ebola-specific treatment facilities, lab resources, or caseworkers in treated areas, suggesting that
resources for screening and contact-tracing were not targeted to areas that received the interventions.
For policy-makers, our findings suggest that in low-resource contexts, accountability interventions can
be leveraged to improve utilization, satisfaction, and patient health. Our estimates for longer-run, Ebola-
related outcomes show that the impact of such interventions can extend to — and may even be amplified in
— crisis settings. To the best of our knowledge, we present the first experimental evidence demonstrating
how accountability interventions affect crises outcomes. Our results suggest that by encouraging patients
to report and seek treatment, which back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest reduced the disease’s repro-
duction rate by 19 percent (see Appendix Section E.23), these simple interventions can improve a health
system’s capacity to weather crises, a marker of resiliency. These results align with other recent work sug-
gesting that social factors, including low levels of trust in the health system, are of crucial importance in
crisis settings such as the Ebola outbreak, where individuals face a choice about whether or not to cooperate
with containment efforts (Blair et al. 2017; Morse et al. 2016; Tsai et al. 2019; Vinck et al. 2019). In fact,
decisions around whether to cooperate also apply to a wide range of epidemic contexts, including the global
outbreak of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19). As such, our findings, which highlight how boosting public
confidence can help contain crises, hold potential implications for a broader range of crises beyond Ebola.
Social interventions like the ones we study here could complement more traditional crisis-response
efforts. For instance, during the 2014–15 Ebola crisis, the WHO designed and deployed eight-bed clinics
called Community Care Centers (CCC). The purpose of these centers was to allay fears about western
medical facilities and, thus, encourage reporting and early isolation and treatment (Michaels-Strasser et al.
2015). In a quasi-experimental evaluation of CCCs, we find that they are successful in encouraging reporting
and isolation during the crisis; in fact, they have effects on reports of confirmed cases that are larger, though
of the same order of magnitude, as the interventions we study here (Christensen et al. forthcoming). Future
work might examine the relative cost-effectiveness of the two types of interventions, as well as potential
complementarities.
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A. Context
A.1 Administrative Boundaries
Figure A.1: Administrative Boundaries
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Maps of Sierra Leone’s different administrative units are provided for reference. Sections (bottom) nest neatly in
chiefdoms (top right), which nest neatly in districts (top left). The original randomized experiment was run in four
districts: Bombali, Tonkolili, Bo, and Kenema.
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A.2 Cross-National Health Indicators
Figure A.2: Health Expenditure and Under-5 Mortality in 2010
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We use measures from the World Development Indicators from 2010 for under-5 mortality (per 1,000 live births) and
health expenditure per capita (in constant 2005 USD). The sample includes countries that the World Bank classifies as
low income. Sierra Leone (SLE) appears to the upper right.
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B. Variable descriptions
B.1 Pre-specified outcome variables and deviations
Below we detail the families of outcome variables analyzed in the medium-term results. Outcome variables
are marked by {i} if measured at the individual level, by {hh} if measured at the household-level, by {com}
if measured at the community/village-level and by {phu} if measured at the clinic-level. Where outcomes
analyzed deviate from our pre-specified analysis plan, we detail the deviation using footnotes. In accounting
for multiple comparisons, we deviate from the original analysis plan in the conservative direction. Orig-
inally, we only planned to control for the false discovery rate (FDR) across just a subset of families, and
within each family, a subset of indicators. We instead make the FDR adjustment across all families, and
within each family, across all indicators.
1. General Utilization Index
(a) Health episodes in response to which individuals visited clinic {i} A1
i. Proportion of all health episodes in response to which individual visited traditional healer
(among individuals experiencing health episodes)
ii. Which health providers did you visit? (among individuals experiencing health episodes)
2. Maternal Utilization Index (maternal episodes)
(a) Antenatal/postnatal care index [standardized summary index of i-ii] {i}
i. Number of ANC visits (among mothers who have given birth in the last year)
ii. Number of PNC visits (among mothers who have given birth in the last year)
(b) Childbirth in facility {i}
i. Proportion of pregnant mothers who gave birth in facility (among mothers who have given
birth in the last year)
3. Health Outcomes
(a) Proportion of households where at least one child under the age of 5 has died (in the past 6
months) {hh}
A1The original analysis plan defined general utilization as an index composed of both the utilization of western medical clinics
(entering the index positively) and utilization of traditional or religious healers (entering negatively). We later found that the survey
questions from which we intended to obtain information on use of traditional or religious healers was unsuitable for this purpose. In
particular, only the illness / injury module asked utilization questions which explicitly included the traditional healers / religious or
spiritual leaders as an option category. For the other three types of health episodes (child birth, vaccinations and ANC/PNC visits),
the answer options contained a health provider category of “other”, which could not be (unambiguously) attributed to traditional
healers. We therefore restrict our utilization variable to utilization of western medical clinics.
A5
(b) Proportion of households where women have died during OR due to complications from preg-
nancy (in the past 6 months) {hh}
(c) Proportion of households where any household member had an illness {hh}
i. Was this episode an illness, an injury or other consultation?
(d) Anthropometric outcomes {hh}
i. Child weight-for-height (Among eligible children. Measured at endline only)
(e) Vaccine completion index: (Among households with eligible children) [standardize d summary
index of A - G] {hh}
i. Proportion of children in household completing full cycle of: (A) BCG, (B) OPV, (C) Penta,
(D) Measles, (E) Yellow Fever, (F) RVV, (G) PCV
(f) Childbirth episode [standardized summary index of i - ii] {hh}
i. Did the mother have health problems during or within two months of the delivery?
ii. Did the baby have health problems during delivery or within one month of birth?
(g) Child illness index [standardized summary index of i - ii] {phu}
i. Number of malaria cases (among children under 5)
ii. Number of diarrhea cases (among children under 5)
4. Satisfaction
(a) How satisfied are you with your family’s health? {hh}
(b) How satisfied are you with the performance of public health workers? {hh}
(c) Satisfaction with services {hh}
i. The last time you visited [CLINIC] in the past one month, how satisfied were you with the
care that you received at the clinic?
ii. The next time you need medical attention for some other reason, would you visit [CLINIC]
again?
5. Clinic Quality
(a) Clinic service provision [standardized summary index of i - vi] {phu}
i. Facility organization index [standardized summary index of A-R]
A. (A) Duty Roster for Staff, (B) Numbered cards for patients, (C) Seating Arrangements,
(D) Suggestion box, (E) Name tags for staff, (F) Rooms labeled, (G) Floor clean, (H)
Walls clean, (I) Area clean/uncluttered, (J) Drug info available, (K) Smells okay, (L)
Coverage graphs, (M) Medicines on floor, (N) Medicines organized by date, (O) Drugs
stored in safe area, (P) Storage room clean, (Q) Storage room has limited access, (R)
Stock cards available
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ii. Proportion of required services provided by clinic (In the past month) [proportion of A-L
the clinic is required to provide]
A. (A) Immunization, (B) Growth monitoring, (C) Treatment of sick children, (D) Antena-
tal care, (E) Family planning, (F) Treatment of STIs/STDs, (G) Deliveries (enumerator
ask anything associated with delivery e.g. soap, incentive for TBAs), (H) HIV / AIDS
counseling and testing (I) Health education, (J) Postnatal care, (K) Nutrition supple-
mentation, (L) Pregnancy test
iii. Frequency of service provision index [standardized summary of the number of days (ii) are
provided]
iv. Proportion of clinics charging for out of stock equipment
v. Number of clinic workers on duty
vi. Reported hours clinic is open (per week)
(b) Proportion of clinics that know about the free health-care policy {phu}
(c) Employee satisfaction index [standardized summary index of i-ii] {phu}
i. Satisfaction with community support/participation
ii. Satisfaction with job overall
6. Health Service Delivery
(a) Absenteeism (among respondents experiencing health episodes) [standardized summary index
of i-ii] {i}
i. Of all the times that you visited the clinic in the past one month, did you ever find there was
no staff present?
ii. The last time you visited the clinic in the past one month, how long did you wait to see the
person who attended to you?
(b) Fee payments (among all health episodes) {i}
i. Did you pay any money for products or services during this consultation?
ii. What is the total estimated value of the items (in cash and in kind) that you gave the per-
son/people who assisted you?
(c) Service delivery (among all health episodes) {i}
i. In the past one month, have you had any problems with the clinic?
ii. What were these problems?
A. Staff not present
B. Drugs not available
C. Facility not clean
D. Unpleasant behaviour from staff
(d) Were medicines in-stock and available at the clinic? (among all health episodes) {i}
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(e) Satisfaction with services {i}
i. The last time you visited the clinic in the past one month, how satisfied were you with the
care that you received at the clinic?
ii. The next time you need medical attention for some other reason, would you visit [CLINIC]
again?
(f) The last time you visited the clinic in the past one month, how would you rate the attitude of the
staff? {i}
7. Community Support
(a) Reported engagement index [standardized summary index of i-iii] {com}
i. Health monitoring facility (HMF)/clinic monitoring facility (CMF) exists
ii. Number of HMC/FMC meetings
iii. Contributions to clinic (e.g. expenditures, nurse veg garden, etc.)A2
(b) Reported community engagement index (past 6 months)[standardized summary index of ii-vi]
{phu}
i. Has the community helped clean this facility?
ii. Has the community helped you with your personal work? E.g. Farm, back garden... etc.
iii. How often have community members helped you with your personal work?
iv. How often has the facility had disputes/conflicts with the community?
8. Community Development and Political Engagement (CDPE)A3
(a) Development projects (Excluding NGOs) {com}A4
i. Has [the Local Council/the Paramount Chief] done any projects that this community (In the
past year, starting May 2012)
ii. Did community members contribute labour, money or local materials for this project (In-
cluding work for food and work for pay)?
iii. Were any community members involved in the planning of this project?
(b) Collective action {com}
i. Has this community worked together to address any problem facing this community? For
each project: (In the past one year since May 2012)
A2 The analysis plan mis-specified financial contributions as originating from the community survey, but it was part of the clinic
survey and is included in index ii accordingly.
A3 Originally, both the CDPE and Community Support indices included the HMC / HMF meetings variables. We retain these as
a part of the Community Support index, as this index is intended to more directly gauge the monitoring mechanism more directly.
However, we verify that omitting these variables from the CDPE index has no consequence on the estimated effect. (These results
are available upon request).
A4 The baseline survey asked for projects in the past two years while the endline survey asked for the past year. In the ANCOVA
specification, we therefore control for projects in the past two years.
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A. What kind of problem did this community address?
B. Did the community approach any person or organization outside the community for
help in addressing this problem?
C. Whom did the community first approach regarding this problem?
D. Is your community satisfied with the way in which the person / organization responded
to your problem?
E. Has this problem now been resolved?
(c) Voting {hh}
i. Do you have a voter registration card?
ii. Did you vote in the last Local Council Elections? (November 2012 election)
iii. Did you vote in the last General Elections? (November 2012 election)
9. Water and Sanitation
(a) Household-level index [standardized summary index of i-ii] {hh}
i. Water
A. What is the main source of drinking water for members of your household?
B. What do you usually do to make the water safer to drink?
C. What is the main source of water used by your household for other purposes such as
cooking and hand washing?
ii. Toilets
A. What type of toilet facility do members of your household usually use?
(b) Community-level index [standardized summary index of i-ii] {com}
i. Water
A. Is there a water facility in this village/community?
B. What kind of water facility is it?
C. Do people from this community usually get water to drink from this water facility?
D. [If not] Where do people from this community usually get water to drink?
ii. Toilets
A. Is there a Communal Waste Disposal site in this village?
B. Are there any public toilets in your community?
(c) Satisfaction index {hh}
i. How satisfied are you with the public health and sanitation facilities such as drainage, toi-
lets, garbage bins and access to clean and safe water?
ii. How satisfied are you with the cleanliness of your community?
iii. Over the last year how has the quality of public health and sanitation changed?
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10. Economic Status
(a) Physical asset index: {hh}
i. How many of the following does this household own in either usable or repairable con-
dition? a) Generator, b) Radio, c) Television, d) Mobile, Telephone, e) Non-mobile Tele-
phone, f) Refrigerator, g) Electric Fan, h) Watch or Clock, i) Umbrella, j) Large Cooking
Pot, k) A Bicycle, l) A Motorcycle or Motor scooter, m) An animal-drawn cart, n) A Car or
Truck, o) A Boat with no Motor, p) A Boat with a Motor
(b) Agricultural asset index {hh}
i. At present, how many agricultural assets does this household own in either usable or re-
pairable condition? E.g. hoe, cutlass, shovel, spade, sickle, plough, cassava grater, thresher
etc. (Dichotomized based on presence)
ii. For each of the animals below, ask “How many “ ” do members of the house-
hold own?” a) Cows/Bulls, b) Horses/Donkeys, c) Pigs, d) Goats, e) Sheep, f) Rabbits, g)
Rodents, h) Fowl (Chickens), i) Ducks, j) Other Birds. (Dichotomized based on presence)
(c) Dwelling materials index {hh}
i. What is the main material of the floors of the house?
ii. What is the material of the roof of the house?
iii. What is the material of the exterior walls of the house?
(d) Total consumption expenditure {hh}
i. How much in total have members of your household spent on “ ” (In the past
month)?
ii. Did you consume “ ” from your own harvest or your own stock in the past month?
A. How much of “ ” did you consume in the past month?A5
A5 In the original analysis plan we also intended to include prices, based on the question, “For how much would you sell this
amount of “ ” if you were to sell it now?” However, these prices were not properly recorded and are therefore omitted
from the index.
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B.2 Descriptive statistics
Table B.1: General Utilization
Median Mean SD Min Max N BL data
(1) Number of health episodes in which sought western care 1 12 ♦ 1 0.988 0.382 0 3 4496 Yes
Questions about ante and post natal care, vaccinations and illness/injury episodes are asked for the past one month. Questions about child birth are asked about the
past year. †: dummy variable; §: likert scale (1-4); ¶: likert scale (1-5); ♦: measured across all health episode types (ante and post natal care, child birth, under-2
vaccinations, and illness and injury); w , 1 , 6 , and 12 stand for measures referring to the last week, one month, six months and twelve months respectively.
Table B.2: Maternal Utilization
Median Mean SD Min Max N BL data
(1) ANC/PNC visits index 12 −0.187 −0.054 0.956 −1.779 5.602 887 Yes
(2) Birth in western medicine facility 12 † 1 0.862 0.345 0 1 877 Yes
†: dummy variable; §: likert scale (1-4); ¶: likert scale (1-5); ♦: measured across all health episode types (ante and post natal care, child birth,
under-2 vaccinations, and illness and injury); w , 1 , 6 , and 12 stand for measures referring to the last week, one month, six months and
twelve months respectively.
Table B.3: Health Outcomes
Median Mean SD Min Max N BL data
(1) U5 Child death per HH 6 † 0 0.033 0.178 0 1 5053 Yes
(2) Maternal death per HH 6 † 0 0.001 0.034 0 1 5053 Yes
(3) Illness/injury in HH 1 † 1 0.583 0.493 0 1 5053 Yes
(4) Child weight for length 0.600 0.621 1.633 −4.910 4.980 1991 No
(5) Vaccine completion index (Under 2) 4 3.117 2.589 0 7 1457 Yes
(6) Child birth complication index 12 −0.619 −0.002 0.975 −0.619 2.649 856 Yes
(7) Child illness index 1 −0.091 0.028 0.924 −1.435 3.424 4993 Yes
Maternal death is defined as death relating to either pregnancy complications or childbirth. The Pentavalent Vaccination targets diphtheria,
tetanus, whooping cough, hepatitis B, and haemophilus influenza type B. †: dummy variable; §: likert scale (1-4); ¶: likert scale (1-5); ♦:
measured across all health episode types (ante and post natal care, child birth, under-2 vaccinations, and illness and injury); w , 1 , 6 , and
12 stand for measures referring to the last week, one month, six months and twelve months respectively.
Table B.4: Satisfaction
Median Mean SD Min Max N BL data
(1) Satisfaction with family health § 4 3.469 0.657 1 4 5052 Yes
(2) Satisfaction with public health workers § 3 3.291 0.791 1 4 4994 Yes
(3) Satisfaction with care 1 ♦ § 4 3.658 0.670 1 4 2535 Yes
(4) Would return to clinic ♦ † 1 0.969 0.168 0 1 2527 Yes
†: dummy variable; §: likert scale (1-4); ¶: likert scale (1-5); ♦: measured across all health episode types (ante and post natal care, child
birth, under-2 vaccinations, and illness and injury); w , 1 , 6 , and 12 stand for measures referring to the last week, one month, six
months and twelve months respectively.
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Table B.5: Clinic Quality
Median Mean SD Min Max N BL data
(1) Clinic service provision index 1 0.034 0.068 1.143 −6.872 3.576 254 Yes
(2) Clinic aware of free health care † 1 0.803 0.398 0 1 254 Yes
(3) Employee satisfaction index 0.295 0.012 0.975 −3.652 1.443 254 Yes
†: dummy variable; §: likert scale (1-4); ¶: likert scale (1-5); ♦: measured across all health episode types (ante and post natal care,
child birth, under-2 vaccinations, and illness and injury); w , 1 , 6 , and 12 stand for measures referring to the last week, one month,
six months and twelve months respectively.
Table B.6: Health Service Delivery
Median Mean SD Min Max N BL data
(1) Absenteeism index 1 ♦ −0.239 0.057 1.070 −0.663 7.471 2874 Yes
(2) Paid for treatment 1 ♦ † 0 0.404 0.491 0 1 2872 Yes
(3) Amount paid 1 ♦ 0 7816.945 35359.126 0 1360000 2843 Yes
(4) Any problem 1 ♦ † 0 0.061 0.240 0 1 2869 Yes
(5) Staff not present 1 ♦ † 0 0.020 0.140 0 1 2869 Yes
(6) Drugs not available 1 ♦ † 0 0.027 0.162 0 1 2869 Yes
(7) Facility not clean 1 ♦ † 0 0.002 0.042 0 1 2869 Yes
(8) Unpleasant staff behavior 1 ♦ † 0 0.021 0.142 0 1 2869 Yes
(9) Medicine always in stock 1 ♦ † 1 0.948 0.221 0 1 2478 No
(10) Individual satisfaction with care 1 ♦ § 4 3.660 0.674 1 4 2863 Yes
(11) Individual would return to clinic ♦ † 1 0.971 0.165 0 1 2853 Yes
(12) Staff attitude 1 ♦ § 4 3.752 0.555 1 4 2845 Yes
†: dummy variable; §: likert scale (1-4); ¶: likert scale (1-5); ♦: measured across all health episode types (ante and post natal care, child birth, under-2 vaccinations,
and illness and injury); w , 1 , 6 , and 12 stand for measures referring to the last week, one month, six months and twelve months respectively.
Table B.7: Community Support
Median Mean SD Min Max N BL data
(1) Contributions to clinic (community survey) 6 0.083 0.075 0.934 −1.170 4.193 508 Yes
(2) Contributions to clinic (facility survey) 6 0.317 −0.051 1.125 −5.373 1.503 508 Yes
In the community survey, we ask about meetings between the clinic and community as well as labor or financial contributions to the clinic. In the clinic
survey, we ask about labor contributions as well as disputes between the community and the clinic. †: dummy variable; §: likert scale (1-4); ¶: likert
scale (1-5); ♦: measured across all health episode types (ante and post natal care, child birth, under-2 vaccinations, and illness and injury); w , 1 , 6 ,
and 12 stand for measures referring to the last week, one month, six months and twelve months respectively.
Table B.8: Community development and political engagement (CDPE)
Median Mean SD Min Max N BL data
(1) Projects with local council/chief 12 † 0 0.089 0.285 0 1 507 Yes
(2) Community provided labor 12 † 0 0.073 0.261 0 1 504 Yes
(3) Community involved in planning 12 † 0 0.050 0.217 0 1 504 Yes
(4) Problem addressed collectively? 12 † 1 0.573 0.495 0 1 508 Yes
(5) Proportion has voter card † 1 0.986 0.040 0.764 1 489 Yes
(6) Proportion voted in local election † 1 0.979 0.050 0.632 1 489 Yes
(7) Proportion voted in general election † 1 0.979 0.050 0.632 1 489 Yes
The Health Management Committee (HMC) meetings and the Facility Management Committee (FMC) meetings have been merged to a
single meeting which we refer to as HMC. The Baseline variables for the government projects refers to projects in the past two years while
at endline it was inquired for the past one year. †: dummy variable; §: likert scale (1-4); ¶: likert scale (1-5);♦: measured across all health
episode types (ante and post natal care, child birth, under-2 vaccinations, and illness and injury); w , 1 , 6 , and 12 stand for measures
referring to the last week, one month, six months and twelve months respectively.
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Table B.9: Water and Sanitation
Median Mean SD Min Max N BL data
(1) Water and sanitation HH index 0.043 0.050 0.987 −5.667 6.236 5053 Yes
(2) Water and sanitation village index −0.012 0.098 1.012 −1.212 3.791 5053 Yes
(3) Satisfaction with village sanitation index 0.290 0.050 0.973 −3.415 1.885 5051 Yes
The household index is comprised of water sources for drinking, for other uses, the existence and type of toilet facilities and the actions households
take to make water safe to drink. The village index contains the existence and types of water sources for drinking and general use as well as the
existence of public toilets and waste facilities. The satisfaction index consists of questions about sanitation and health services offered as well as
village cleanliness. †: dummy variable; §: likert scale (1-4); ¶: likert scale (1-5); ♦: measured across all health episode types (ante and post natal
care, child birth, under-2 vaccinations, and illness and injury); w , 1 , 6 , and 12 stand for measures referring to the last week, one month, six
months and twelve months respectively.
Table B.10: Economic Outcomes
Median Mean SD Min Max N BL data
(1) Physical asset index −0.245 0.014 1.052 −0.701 14.438 5052 Yes
(2) Agricultural asset index −0.284 0.075 1.803 −0.560 58.153 5051 No
(3) Dwelling materials index −0.163 0.038 1.018 −7.644 6.723 5052 Yes
(4) Total consumption expenditure 1 −0.225 0.016 1.031 −1.311 14.540 5053 Yes
†: dummy variable; §: likert scale (1-4); ¶: likert scale (1-5); ♦: measured across all health episode types (ante and post natal care, child
birth, under-2 vaccinations, and illness and injury); w , 1 , 6 , and 12 stand for measures referring to the last week, one month, six
months and twelve months respectively.
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C. Integrity of the experiment
Table C.1: Baseline Balance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control
Mean CM NFA Difference N
Village characteristics
Motorable road 0.891 −0.009 0.005 −0.014 503
(0.313) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
Mobile phone coverage 0.812 0.058 0.096 −0.038 504
(0.392) (0.044) (0.041)∗∗ (0.037)
Distance to the closest clinic 1.362 −0.204 0.338 −0.542 504
(2.217) (0.329) (0.481) (0.463)
Travel cost to closest clinic 94.225 −24.273 −24.389 0.116 503
(869.677) (72.811) (74.502) (65.453)
Household characteristics and questions to household head
Household size 3.369 −0.061 0.007 −0.068 4774
(2.979) (0.056) (0.058) (0.059)
Number of illness or injury cases per household 0.054 −0.039 −0.026 −0.013 4774
(0.237) (0.011)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗ (0.013)
Birth in household last year 0.157 −0.028 0.009 −0.037 2127
(0.363) (0.014)∗∗ (0.015) (0.014)∗∗
Child under 2 in household 0.230 −0.013 0.027 −0.040 2126
(0.421) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)∗∗
Prominent village member in household 0.042 −0.007 −0.002 −0.005 2090
(0.200) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Believes doctor’s advice 0.995 0.000 −0.007 0.007 1977
(0.072) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)∗
Health care fees unaffordable 2.307 0.023 0.030 −0.007 2057
(0.784) (0.045) (0.050) (0.046)
Trust in the community 1.856 −0.032 −0.010 −0.021 2127
(0.663) (0.051) (0.049) (0.052)
Community cohesion 2.420 −0.018 0.009 −0.026 2122
(0.610) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035)
Believe VHC members represent your interest 2.743 0.094 0.159 −0.066 984
(1.061) (0.107) (0.122) (0.104)
The VHC can be trusted 2.453 −0.171 −0.089 −0.083 1148
(0.967) (0.103)∗ (0.106) (0.101)
Individual characteristics
Muslim 0.854 −0.037 −0.017 −0.021 9761
(0.353) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029)
Mende (Ethnicity) 0.418 −0.019 −0.005 −0.014 9759
(0.493) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Temne (Ethnicity) 0.348 0.023 0.078 −0.055 9759
(0.476) (0.039) (0.036)∗∗ (0.035)
Highest level of education 2.920 −0.013 0.256 −0.269 9734
(4.203) (0.124) (0.134)∗ (0.136)∗∗
Notes: This table illustrates the baseline balance across the three treatment arms (control, community monitoring and
non-financial awards) among households surveyed in both waves. Column (1) shows the characteristics of the control
group at baseline (mean and standard deviation). Columns (2) and (3) indicate the regression coefficients and standard
errors of the CM and NFA treatment arms compared to the control group. Column (4) compares the two treatment arms.
Household size and number of illness or injury cases per household contain a larger number of observations relative
to other household level characteristics because these measures were also collected in the shorter user feedback survey
discussed in Section 3.1.1. Significance: * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and *** is
significant at the 1% level.
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Table C.2: Manipulation Checks: Community Monitoring (CM)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
(1) CM meetings by PLAN, Concern, or IRC
took place
0.435 0.269 0.421 0.115 506
(0.497) (0.047)∗∗∗ (0.050)∗∗∗ (0.053)∗∗
(2) How many CM meetings took place? 0.897 1.055 1.631 0.483 498
(1.218) (0.142)∗∗∗ (0.156)∗∗∗ (0.157)∗∗∗
(3) Was village informed of meeting outcomes? 0.411 0.266 0.403 0.127 506
(0.493) (0.049)∗∗∗ (0.054)∗∗∗ (0.055)∗∗
Notes: Treatment effects are estimated using ANCOVA, controlling for the community-level average of the outcome family index
at baseline and matching-triplet fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by clinic, are shown in parentheses. Significance:
* is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and *** is significant at the 1% level.
Table C.3: Manipulation Checks: Non-Financial Awards (NFA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
(1) Clinic staff heard of NFA? 0.476 0.331 0.190 0.473 254
(0.502) (0.063)∗∗∗ (0.073)∗∗∗ (0.064)∗∗∗
(2) Clinic participated in NFA? 0.155 0.428 0.198 0.657 254
(0.364) (0.061)∗∗∗ (0.067)∗∗∗ (0.063)∗∗∗
Notes: Treatment effects are estimated using ANCOVA, controlling for the community-level average of the outcome family index
at baseline and matching-triplet fixed effects. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Significance: * is significant at
the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and *** is significant at the 1% level.
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D. Endline results
D.1 Outcome Family tables (raw, not z-scored)
Table D.1: General Utilization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
General utilization (SUR) 0.112 0.126 0.099 4496
(0.031)∗∗∗ (0.034)∗∗∗ (0.036)∗∗∗
[0.003]∗∗∗ [0.003]∗∗∗ [0.025]∗∗
(1) Number of health episodes in which sought
western care
0.962 0.044 0.049 0.039 4496
(0.393) (0.012)∗∗∗ (0.013)∗∗∗ (0.014)∗∗∗
[0.001]∗∗∗ [0.001]∗∗∗ [0.008]∗∗∗
Notes: Treatment effects are estimated using Missing-Indicator ANCOVA, controlling for the community-level average of the
outcome family index at baseline and matching-triplet fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by clinic, are shown in
parentheses. Questions about ante and post natal care, vaccinations and illness/injury episodes are asked for the past one month.
Questions about child birth are asked about the past year. Significance: * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the
5% level and *** is significant at the 1% level.
Table D.2: Maternal Utilization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
Maternal utilization index (SUR) 0.046 0.130 −0.031 888
(0.045) (0.054)∗∗ (0.054)
[0.322] [0.079]∗ [0.463]
(1) ANC/PNC visits index 0.000 −0.038 0.008 −0.079 887
(1.000) (0.064) (0.082) (0.068)
[0.386] [0.861] [0.968]
(2) Birth in western medicine facility 0.834 0.048 0.094 0.006 877
(0.373) (0.025)∗ (0.028)∗∗∗ (0.030)
[0.114] [0.002]∗∗∗ [0.968]
Notes: Treatment effects are estimated using Missing-Indicator ANCOVA, controlling for the community-level average of the
outcome family index at baseline and matching-triplet fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by clinic, are shown in
parentheses. Multiple-inference corrected q-values that adjust for the false discovery rate within treatment arm are shown in
square brackets. Significance: * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and *** is significant at the 1%
level.
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Table D.3: Health Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
Health outcomes index (SUR) 0.021 0.055 −0.010 5053
(0.023) (0.025)∗∗ (0.027)
[0.322] [0.094]∗ [0.463]
(1) U5 Child death per HH 0.039 −0.009 −0.015 −0.004 5053
(0.193) (0.005)∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.006)
[0.544] [0.039]∗∗ [1.000]
(2) Maternal death per HH 0.001 0.000 0.001 −0.001 5053
(0.035) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
[1.000] [0.462] [1.000]
(3) Illness/injury in HH 0.579 −0.003 −0.009 0.004 5053
(0.494) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019)
[1.000] [0.462] [1.000]
(4) Child weight for length 0.546 0.133 0.156 0.109 1991
(1.682) (0.081) (0.093)∗ (0.093)
[0.544] [0.252] [1.000]
(5) Vaccine completion index (Under 2) 3.085 0.032 0.303 −0.209 1457
(2.560) (0.152) (0.184) (0.163)
[1.000] [0.252] [1.000]
(6) Child birth complication index 0.000 −0.026 −0.126 0.061 856
(1.000) (0.077) (0.086) (0.087)
[1.000] [0.277] [1.000]
(7) Child illness index 0.002 0.024 0.031 0.018 4993
(0.995) (0.102) (0.115) (0.115)
[1.000] [0.513] [1.000]
Notes: Treatment effects are estimated using Missing-Indicator ANCOVA, controlling for the community-level average of the
outcome family index at baseline and matching-triplet fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by clinic, are shown in
parentheses. Multiple-inference corrected q-values that adjust for the false discovery rate within treatment arm are shown in
square brackets.Maternal death is defined as death relating to either pregnancy complications or childbirth. The Pentavalent
Vaccination targets diphtheria, tetanus, whooping cough, hepatitis B, and haemophilus influenza type B. Significance: * is
significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and *** is significant at the 1% level.
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Table D.4: Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
Satisfaction index (SUR) 0.064 0.059 0.069 5052
(0.030)∗∗ (0.034)∗ (0.034)∗∗
[0.058]∗ [0.139] [0.080]∗
(1) Satisfaction with family health 3.439 0.055 0.051 0.059 5052
(0.670) (0.027)∗∗ (0.030)∗ (0.029)∗∗
[0.096]∗ [0.642] [0.102]
(2) Satisfaction with public health workers 3.258 0.069 0.052 0.083 4994
(0.802) (0.034)∗∗ (0.041) (0.039)∗∗
[0.096]∗ [0.642] [0.102]
(3) Satisfaction with care 3.646 0.034 0.039 0.030 2535
(0.696) (0.035) (0.039) (0.039)
[0.196] [0.642] [0.287]
(4) Would return to clinic 0.967 0.007 0.007 0.007 2527
(0.174) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
[0.196] [0.642] [0.287]
Notes: Treatment effects are estimated using Missing-Indicator ANCOVA, controlling for the community-level average of the
outcome family index at baseline and matching-triplet fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by clinic, are shown in
parentheses. Significance: * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and *** is significant at the 1% level.
Table D.5: Clinic Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
Clinic quality index (SUR) 0.055 −0.002 0.112 254
(0.064) (0.074) (0.075)
[0.322] [0.644] [0.157]
(1) Clinic service provision index 0.000 0.149 0.095 0.203 254
(1.000) (0.153) (0.180) (0.175)
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
(2) Clinic aware of free health care 0.798 0.005 −0.023 0.033 254
(0.404) (0.052) (0.060) (0.058)
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
(3) Employee satisfaction index 0.000 0.003 −0.043 0.049 254
(1.000) (0.127) (0.141) (0.152)
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
Notes: Treatment effects are estimated using ANCOVA, controlling for the community-level average of the outcome family index
at baseline and matching-triplet fixed effects. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Multiple-inference corrected q-
values that adjust for the false discovery rate within treatment arm are shown in square brackets. The Clinic service provision
index is composed of measures on facility maintenance (mainly cleanliness, orderly medicine storage and signposting) and
whether required services like pre- and post-natal care, immunization, reproductive health and other forms of consultation are
provided. The employee satisfaction index consists of employees’ satisfaction with their job, with the communities’ participation
in the clinic and the extend to which they feel supported by the communities. Significance: * is significant at the 10% level, **
is significant at the 5% level and *** is significant at the 1% level.
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Table D.6: Health Service Delivery
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
Health service delivery index (SUR) 0.021 0.037 0.015 2877
(0.029) (0.035) (0.031)
[0.355] [0.254] [0.463]
(1) Absenteeism index 0.000 0.075 −0.017 0.109 2874
(1.000) (0.057) (0.070) (0.063)∗
[0.887] [1.000] [0.710]
(2) Paid for treatment 0.416 −0.002 −0.036 0.011 2872
(0.493) (0.023) (0.033) (0.024)
[1.000] [1.000] [0.786]
(3) Amount paid 8520.158 553.416 −1472.904 1321.751 2843
(31895.827) (1409.161) (1725.193) (1496.821)
[0.948] [1.000] [0.772]
(4) Any problem 0.063 −0.000 −0.002 0.001 2869
(0.242) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017)
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
(5) Staff not present 0.019 0.005 0.001 0.006 2869
(0.137) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
[0.887] [1.000] [0.772]
(6) Drugs not available 0.031 −0.005 −0.007 −0.004 2869
(0.174) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
[0.887] [1.000] [0.786]
(7) Facility not clean 0.003 −0.002 −0.003 −0.002 2869
(0.058) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
[0.887] [1.000] [0.710]
(8) Unpleasant staff behavior 0.022 −0.010 −0.005 −0.013 2869
(0.148) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008)
[0.887] [1.000] [0.710]
(9) Medicine always in stock 0.952 0.006 −0.001 0.008 2478
(0.214) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010)
[0.887] [1.000] [0.772]
(10) Individual satisfaction with care 3.645 0.039 0.069 0.028 2863
(0.703) (0.039) (0.048) (0.041)
[0.887] [1.000] [0.772]
(11) Would return to clinic 0.969 0.013 0.018 0.011 2853
(0.173) (0.007)∗ (0.010)∗ (0.007)
[0.887] [1.000] [0.710]
(12) Staff attitude 3.735 0.043 −0.011 0.063 2845
(0.580) (0.029) (0.038) (0.031)∗∗
[0.887] [1.000] [0.710]
Notes: Treatment effects are estimated using Missing-Indicator ANCOVA, controlling for the community-level average of the
outcome family index at baseline and matching-triplet fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by clinic, are shown in
parentheses. Multiple-inference corrected q-values that adjust for the false discovery rate within treatment arm are shown in
square brackets.The absenteeism index is composed of an indicator of whether patients had ever found no staff present when
visiting the clinic and the waiting time at the last visit. Significance: * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5%
level and *** is significant at the 1% level.
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Table D.7: Community Support
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
Contributions to clinic index (SUR) 0.025 0.034 0.016 508
(0.052) (0.061) (0.060)
[0.465] [0.476] [0.463]
(1) Contributions to clinic index (community survey) 0.000 0.109 0.134 0.084 508
(1.000) (0.078) (0.092) (0.092)
[0.490] [0.404] [1.000]
(2) Contributions to clinic index (facility survey) 0.000 −0.059 −0.067 −0.052 508
(0.997) (0.121) (0.142) (0.136)
[0.490] [0.471] [1.000]
Notes: Treatment effects are estimated using ANCOVA, controlling for the community-level average of the outcome family index
at baseline and matching-triplet fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by clinic, are shown in parentheses. The two
indices of contributions to the clinic are composed of variables that measure support and contributions once from the perspective
of key informants in the villages and once by health personnel. In the community survey, we ask about meetings between the
clinic and community as well as labor contributions to the clinic. In the clinic survey, we ask about labor or financial contributions
as well as disputes between the community and the clinic. Significance: * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the
5% level and *** is significant at the 1% level.
Table D.8: Community development and political engagement (CDPE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
CDPE index (SUR) 0.132 0.116 0.150 508
(0.049)∗∗∗ (0.060)∗ (0.056)∗∗∗
[0.033]∗∗ [0.114] [0.025]∗∗
(1) Projects with local council/chief 0.054 0.047 0.050 0.043 507
(0.226) (0.022)∗∗ (0.026)∗ (0.026)∗
[0.090]∗ [0.465] [0.129]
(2) Community provided labor 0.042 0.040 0.038 0.042 504
(0.201) (0.019)∗∗ (0.022)∗ (0.023)∗
[0.090]∗ [0.465] [0.129]
(3) Community involved in planning 0.030 0.022 0.026 0.018 504
(0.171) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020)
[0.103] [0.465] [0.161]
(4) Problem addressed collectively? 0.583 −0.021 −0.024 −0.018 508
(0.494) (0.040) (0.045) (0.046)
[0.277] [0.533] [0.247]
(5) Proportion has voter card 0.983 0.005 0.003 0.007 489
(0.045) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)∗
[0.103] [0.533] [0.129]
(6) Proportion voted in local election 0.973 0.009 0.005 0.012 489
(0.054) (0.004)∗∗ (0.005) (0.005)∗∗
[0.090]∗ [0.465] [0.099]∗
(7) Proportion voted in general election 0.973 0.009 0.008 0.011 489
(0.055) (0.005)∗∗ (0.005) (0.005)∗∗
[0.090]∗ [0.465] [0.109]
Notes: Treatment effects are estimated using ANCOVA, controlling for the community-level average of the outcome family
index at baseline and matching-triplet fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by clinic, are shown in parentheses. The
Baseline variables for projects with the local council/chief refer to projects in the past two years while at endline it was inquired
for the past one year. Significance: * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and *** is significant at the
1% level.
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Table D.9: Water and Sanitation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
Water and sanitation index (SUR) 0.110 0.066 0.154 5053
(0.044)∗∗ (0.051) (0.051)∗∗∗
[0.037]∗∗ [0.210] [0.025]∗∗
(1) Water and sanitation HH index 0.000 0.068 −0.022 0.159 5053
(1.000) (0.058) (0.068) (0.063)∗∗
[0.089]∗ [0.362] [0.040]∗∗
(2) Water and sanitation village index −0.016 0.175 0.132 0.218 5053
(1.003) (0.087)∗∗ (0.097) (0.104)∗∗
[0.073]∗ [0.298] [0.040]∗∗
(3) Satisfaction with village sanitation index 0.000 0.087 0.087 0.086 5051
(1.000) (0.043)∗∗ (0.049)∗ (0.050)∗
[0.073]∗ [0.298] [0.059]∗
Notes: Treatment effects are estimated using Missing-Indicator ANCOVA, controlling for the community-level average of the
outcome family index at baseline and matching-triplet fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by clinic, are shown in
parentheses. The household index is comprised of water sources for drinking, for other uses, the existence and type of toilet
facilities and the actions households take to make water safe to drink. The village index contains the existence and types of water
sources for drinking and general use as well as the existence of public toilets and waste facilities. The satisfaction index consists
of questions about sanitation and health services offered as well as village cleanliness. Significance: * is significant at the 10%
level, ** is significant at the 5% level and *** is significant at the 1% level.
Table D.10: Economic Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
Economic outcomes index (SUR) 0.053 0.036 0.070 5053
(0.032) (0.037) (0.040)∗
[0.138] [0.262] [0.119]
(1) Physical asset index 0.000 0.020 −0.023 0.063 5052
(1.000) (0.048) (0.053) (0.059)
[1.000] [1.000] [0.404]
(2) Agricultural asset index 0.000 0.120 0.174 0.065 5051
(1.000) (0.044)∗∗∗ (0.057)∗∗∗ (0.050)
[0.026]∗∗ [0.010]∗∗∗ [0.404]
(3) Dwelling materials index 0.000 0.053 0.020 0.087 5052
(1.000) (0.053) (0.060) (0.058)
[0.875] [1.000] [0.404]
(4) Total consumption expenditure 0.000 0.019 −0.027 0.066 5053
(1.000) (0.045) (0.050) (0.055)
[1.000] [1.000] [0.404]
Notes: Treatment effects are estimated using Missing-Indicator ANCOVA, controlling for the community-level average of the
outcome family index at baseline and matching-triplet fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by clinic, are shown in
parentheses. Significance: * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and *** is significant at the 1% level.
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D.2 Outcome family tables (z-scored)
We omit the z-scored general utilization table here, since this outcome family has only one ingredient vari-
able. The coefficients on that variable and its SUR index would replicate the coefficients reported in Table 1
and are therefore redundant.
Table D.11: Maternal utilization (z-scored)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
Maternal utilization index (SUR) 0.046 0.130 −0.031 888
(0.045) (0.054)∗∗ (0.054)
[0.322] [0.079]∗ [0.463]
(1) ANC/PNC visits index 0.000 −0.038 0.008 −0.079 887
(1.000) (0.064) (0.082) (0.068)
[0.386] [0.861] [0.968]
(2) Birth in western medicine facility 0.000 0.130 0.252 0.017 877
(1.000) (0.066)∗ (0.074)∗∗∗ (0.082)
[0.114] [0.002]∗∗∗ [0.968]
Notes: Variables are control-group normalized at endline (z-scored). Treatment effects are estimated using Missing-Indicator
ANCOVA, controlling for the community-level average of the outcome family index at baseline and matching-triplet fixed effects.
Robust standard errors, clustered by clinic, are shown in parentheses. Multiple-inference corrected q-values that adjust for the
false discovery rate within treatment arm are shown in square brackets. Significance: * is significant at the 10% level, ** is
significant at the 5% level and *** is significant at the 1% level.
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Table D.12: Health outcomes (z-scored)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
Health outcomes index (SUR) 0.021 0.055 −0.010 5053
(0.023) (0.025)∗∗ (0.027)
[0.322] [0.094]∗ [0.463]
(1) U5 Child death per HH 0.000 −0.047 −0.075 −0.019 5053
(1.000) (0.025)∗ (0.027)∗∗∗ (0.030)
[0.544] [0.039]∗∗ [1.000]
(2) Maternal death per HH 0.000 0.000 0.017 −0.017 5053
(1.000) (0.026) (0.031) (0.028)
[1.000] [0.462] [1.000]
(3) Illness/injury in HH 0.000 −0.005 −0.018 0.007 5053
(1.000) (0.033) (0.037) (0.039)
[1.000] [0.462] [1.000]
(4) Child weight for length 0.000 0.079 0.093 0.065 1991
(1.000) (0.048) (0.055)∗ (0.055)
[0.544] [0.252] [1.000]
(5) Vaccine completion index (Under 2) 0.000 0.012 0.118 −0.082 1457
(1.000) (0.059) (0.072) (0.064)
[1.000] [0.252] [1.000]
(6) Child birth complication index 0.000 −0.026 −0.126 0.061 856
(1.000) (0.077) (0.086) (0.087)
[1.000] [0.277] [1.000]
(7) Child illness index 0.000 0.024 0.031 0.018 4993
(1.000) (0.102) (0.115) (0.116)
[1.000] [0.513] [1.000]
Notes: Variables are control-group normalized at endline (z-scored). Treatment effects are estimated using Missing-Indicator
ANCOVA, controlling for the community-level average of the outcome family index at baseline and matching-triplet fixed
effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by clinic, are shown in parentheses. Multiple-inference corrected q-values that adjust
for the false discovery rate within treatment arm are shown in square brackets.Maternal death is defined as death relating to
either pregnancy complications or childbirth. The Pentavalent Vaccination targets diphtheria, tetanus, whooping cough, hepatitis
B, and haemophilus influenza type B. Significance: * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and *** is
significant at the 1% level.
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Table D.13: Satisfaction (z-scored)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
Satisfaction index (SUR) 0.064 0.059 0.069 5052
(0.030)∗∗ (0.034)∗ (0.034)∗∗
[0.058]∗ [0.139] [0.080]∗
(1) Satisfaction with family health 0.000 0.082 0.076 0.088 5052
(1.000) (0.040)∗∗ (0.046)∗ (0.044)∗∗
[0.096]∗ [0.642] [0.102]
(2) Satisfaction with public health workers 0.000 0.085 0.065 0.103 4994
(1.000) (0.042)∗∗ (0.051) (0.049)∗∗
[0.096]∗ [0.642] [0.102]
(3) Satisfaction with care 0.000 0.049 0.056 0.043 2535
(1.000) (0.050) (0.056) (0.056)
[0.196] [0.642] [0.287]
(4) Would return to clinic 0.000 0.039 0.038 0.041 2527
(1.000) (0.040) (0.048) (0.044)
[0.196] [0.642] [0.287]
Notes: Variables are control-group normalized at endline (z-scored). Treatment effects are estimated using Missing-Indicator
ANCOVA, controlling for the community-level average of the outcome family index at baseline and matching-triplet fixed
effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by clinic, are shown in parentheses. Significance: * is significant at the 10% level, **
is significant at the 5% level and *** is significant at the 1% level.
Table D.14: Clinic Quality (z-scored)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
Clinic quality index (SUR) 0.055 −0.002 0.112 254
(0.064) (0.074) (0.075)
[0.322] [0.644] [0.157]
(1) Clinic service provision index 0.000 0.149 0.095 0.203 254
(1.000) (0.153) (0.180) (0.175)
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
(2) Clinic aware of free health care 0.000 0.012 −0.058 0.083 254
(1.000) (0.129) (0.148) (0.144)
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
(3) Employee satisfaction index 0.000 0.003 −0.043 0.049 254
(1.000) (0.127) (0.141) (0.152)
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
Notes: Variables are control-group normalized at endline (z-scored). Treatment effects are estimated using ANCOVA, controlling
for the community-level average of the outcome family index at baseline and matching-triplet fixed effects. Robust standard
errors are shown in parentheses. Multiple-inference corrected q-values that adjust for the false discovery rate within treatment
arm are shown in square brackets. The Clinic service provision index is composed of measures on facility maintenance (mainly
cleanliness, orderly medicine storage and signposting) and whether required services like pre- and post-natal care, immunization,
reproductive health and other forms of consultation are provided. The employee satisfaction index consists of employees’
satisfaction with their job, with the communities’ participation in the clinic and the extend to which they feel supported by the
communities. Significance: * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and *** is significant at the 1%
level.
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Table D.15: Health Service Delivery (z-scored)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
Health service delivery index (SUR) 0.021 0.037 0.015 2877
(0.029) (0.035) (0.031)
[0.355] [0.254] [0.463]
(1) Absenteeism index 0.000 0.075 −0.017 0.109 2874
(1.000) (0.057) (0.070) (0.063)∗
[0.887] [1.000] [0.710]
(2) Paid for treatment 0.000 −0.004 −0.074 0.022 2872
(1.000) (0.047) (0.066) (0.048)
[1.000] [1.000] [0.786]
(3) Amount paid 0.000 0.017 −0.046 0.041 2843
(1.000) (0.044) (0.054) (0.047)
[0.948] [1.000] [0.772]
(4) Any problem 0.000 −0.000 −0.008 0.003 2869
(1.000) (0.066) (0.074) (0.069)
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
(5) Staff not present 0.000 0.035 0.004 0.047 2869
(1.000) (0.062) (0.070) (0.066)
[0.887] [1.000] [0.772]
(6) Drugs not available 0.000 −0.030 −0.042 −0.025 2869
(1.000) (0.052) (0.056) (0.056)
[0.887] [1.000] [0.786]
(7) Facility not clean 0.000 −0.042 −0.053 −0.037 2869
(1.000) (0.026) (0.034) (0.028)
[0.887] [1.000] [0.710]
(8) Unpleasant staff behavior 0.000 −0.071 −0.033 −0.085 2869
(1.000) (0.054) (0.072) (0.053)
[0.887] [1.000] [0.710]
(9) Medicine always in stock 0.000 0.026 −0.006 0.038 2478
(1.000) (0.043) (0.059) (0.045)
[0.887] [1.000] [0.772]
(10) Individual satisfaction with care 0.000 0.056 0.098 0.041 2863
(1.000) (0.056) (0.068) (0.059)
[0.887] [1.000] [0.772]
(11) Would return to clinic 0.000 0.074 0.105 0.063 2853
(1.000) (0.042)∗ (0.057)∗ (0.042)
[0.887] [1.000] [0.710]
(12) Staff attitude 0.000 0.075 −0.019 0.109 2845
(1.000) (0.050) (0.066) (0.053)∗∗
[0.887] [1.000] [0.710]
Notes: Variables are control-group normalized at endline (z-scored). Treatment effects are estimated using Missing-Indicator
ANCOVA, controlling for the community-level average of the outcome family index at baseline and matching-triplet fixed effects.
Robust standard errors, clustered by clinic, are shown in parentheses. Multiple-inference corrected q-values that adjust for the
false discovery rate within treatment arm are shown in square brackets.The absenteeism index is composed of an indicator of
whether patients had ever found no staff present when visiting the clinic and the waiting time at the last visit. Significance: * is
significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and *** is significant at the 1% level.
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Table D.16: Contributions to Clinic (z-scored)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
Contributions to clinic index (SUR) 0.025 0.034 0.016 508
(0.052) (0.061) (0.060)
[0.465] [0.476] [0.463]
(1) Contributions to clinic index (community survey) 0.000 0.109 0.134 0.084 508
(1.000) (0.078) (0.092) (0.092)
[0.490] [0.404] [1.000]
(2) Contributions to clinic index (facility survey) 0.000 −0.060 −0.067 −0.052 508
(1.000) (0.121) (0.143) (0.136)
[0.490] [0.471] [1.000]
Notes: Variables are control-group normalized at endline (z-scored). Treatment effects are estimated using ANCOVA, controlling
for the community-level average of the outcome family index at baseline and matching-triplet fixed effects. Robust standard
errors, clustered by clinic, are shown in parentheses. The two indices of contributions to the clinic are composed of variables
that measure support and contributions once from the perspective of key informants in the villages and once by health personnel.
In the community survey, we ask about meetings between the clinic and community as well as labor contributions to the clinic.
In the clinic survey, we ask about labor or financial contributions as well as disputes between the community and the clinic.
Significance: * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and *** is significant at the 1% level.
Table D.17: Community Development and Political Engagement (CDPE, z-scored)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
CDPE index (SUR) 0.132 0.116 0.150 508
(0.049)∗∗∗ (0.060)∗ (0.056)∗∗∗
[0.033]∗∗ [0.114] [0.025]∗∗
(1) Projects with local council/chief 0.000 0.208 0.223 0.192 507
(1.000) (0.095)∗∗ (0.114)∗ (0.116)∗
[0.090]∗ [0.465] [0.129]
(2) Community provided labor 0.000 0.200 0.190 0.209 504
(1.000) (0.095)∗∗ (0.112)∗ (0.116)∗
[0.090]∗ [0.465] [0.129]
(3) Community involved in planning 0.000 0.127 0.150 0.103 504
(1.000) (0.095) (0.117) (0.115)
[0.103] [0.465] [0.161]
(4) Problem addressed collectively? 0.000 −0.043 −0.049 −0.037 508
(1.000) (0.080) (0.092) (0.094)
[0.277] [0.533] [0.247]
(5) Proportion has voter card 0.000 0.102 0.061 0.145 489
(1.000) (0.076) (0.087) (0.087)∗
[0.103] [0.533] [0.129]
(6) Proportion voted in local election 0.000 0.163 0.099 0.231 489
(1.000) (0.082)∗∗ (0.094) (0.092)∗∗
[0.090]∗ [0.465] [0.099]∗
(7) Proportion voted in general election 0.000 0.172 0.140 0.206 489
(1.000) (0.085)∗∗ (0.097) (0.096)∗∗
[0.090]∗ [0.465] [0.109]
Notes: Variables are control-group normalized at endline (z-scored). Treatment effects are estimated using ANCOVA, controlling
for the community-level average of the outcome family index at baseline and matching-triplet fixed effects. Robust standard
errors, clustered by clinic, are shown in parentheses. The Baseline variables for projects with the local council/chief refer to
projects in the past two years while at endline it was inquired for the past one year. Significance: * is significant at the 10% level,
** is significant at the 5% level and *** is significant at the 1% level.
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Table D.18: Water and Sanitation (z-scored)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
Water and sanitation index (SUR) 0.110 0.066 0.154 5053
(0.044)∗∗ (0.051) (0.051)∗∗∗
[0.037]∗∗ [0.210] [0.025]∗∗
(1) Water and sanitation HH index 0.000 0.068 −0.022 0.159 5053
(1.000) (0.058) (0.068) (0.063)∗∗
[0.089]∗ [0.362] [0.040]∗∗
(2) Water and sanitation village index 0.000 0.174 0.131 0.218 5053
(1.000) (0.086)∗∗ (0.097) (0.104)∗∗
[0.073]∗ [0.298] [0.040]∗∗
(3) Satisfaction with village sanitation index 0.000 0.087 0.087 0.086 5051
(1.000) (0.043)∗∗ (0.049)∗ (0.050)∗
[0.073]∗ [0.298] [0.059]∗
Notes: Variables are control-group normalized at endline (z-scored). Treatment effects are estimated using Missing-Indicator
ANCOVA, controlling for the community-level average of the outcome family index at baseline and matching-triplet fixed effects.
Robust standard errors, clustered by clinic, are shown in parentheses. The household index is comprised of water sources for
drinking, for other uses, the existence and type of toilet facilities and the actions households take to make water safe to drink.
The village index contains the existence and types of water sources for drinking and general use as well as the existence of public
toilets and waste facilities. The satisfaction index consists of questions about sanitation and health services offered as well as
village cleanliness. Significance: * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and *** is significant at the
1% level.
Table D.19: Economic Outcomes (z-scored)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
Economic outcomes index (SUR) 0.053 0.036 0.070 5053
(0.032) (0.037) (0.040)∗
[0.138] [0.262] [0.119]
(1) Physical asset index 0.000 0.020 −0.023 0.063 5052
(1.000) (0.048) (0.053) (0.059)
[1.000] [1.000] [0.404]
(2) Agricultural asset index 0.000 0.120 0.174 0.065 5051
(1.000) (0.044)∗∗∗ (0.057)∗∗∗ (0.050)
[0.026]∗∗ [0.010]∗∗∗ [0.404]
(3) Dwelling materials index 0.000 0.053 0.020 0.087 5052
(1.000) (0.053) (0.060) (0.058)
[0.875] [1.000] [0.404]
(4) Total consumption expenditure 0.000 0.019 −0.027 0.066 5053
(1.000) (0.045) (0.050) (0.055)
[1.000] [1.000] [0.404]
Notes: Variables are control-group normalized at endline (z-scored). Treatment effects are estimated using Missing-Indicator
ANCOVA, controlling for the community-level average of the outcome family index at baseline and matching-triplet fixed
effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by clinic, are shown in parentheses. Significance: * is significant at the 10% level, **
is significant at the 5% level and *** is significant at the 1% level.
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D.3 Additional outcome tables
Table D.20: Perceived quality of care
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
(1) Perceived quality of care index 0.000 0.351 0.363 0.340 254
(1.000) (0.121)∗∗∗ (0.139)∗∗∗ (0.143)∗∗
(2) General utilization 0.962 0.044 0.049 0.039 4496
(0.393) (0.012)∗∗∗ (0.013)∗∗∗ (0.014)∗∗∗
(3) Satisfaction with public health workers 3.258 0.056 0.036 0.076 4994
(0.802) (0.034)∗ (0.040) (0.039)∗
(4) Effectiveness of western medicine relative to traditional or religious healing −0.361 0.036 0.045 0.028 5053
(0.200) (0.020)∗ (0.023)∗ (0.023)
Notes: Treatment effects are estimated using Missing-Indicator ANCOVA, controlling for the community-level average of the outcome family index at baseline and matching-triplet
fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by clinic, are shown in parentheses. Significance: * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and *** is significant
at the 1% level.
Table D.21: PHU utilization
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
(1) Number of health episodes in which sought western care 0.962 0.044 0.049 0.039 4496
(0.393) (0.012)∗∗∗ (0.013)∗∗∗ (0.014)∗∗∗
(2) Number of health episodes in which sought western care at PHU 0.883 0.059 0.065 0.053 4496
(0.463) (0.017)∗∗∗ (0.019)∗∗∗ (0.020)∗∗
Notes: Treatment effects are estimated using Missing-Indicator ANCOVA, controlling for the community-level average of the outcome family index at baseline and matching-triplet
fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by clinic, are shown in parentheses. Significance: * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and *** is significant
at the 1% level.
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Table D.22: Comparing Effects on Two Absenteeism Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
(1) Ever no staff present among all clinic visits 0.055 0.034 0.021 0.048 2870
(0.228) (0.012)∗∗∗ (0.014) (0.015)∗∗∗
(2) No staff present on last clinic visit 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.004 1885
(0.083) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Notes: Treatment effects are estimated using Missing-Indicator ANCOVA, controlling for the community-level average of the
outcome family index at baseline and matching-triplet fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by clinic, are shown in
parentheses. Significance: * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and *** is significant at the 1% level.
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Table D.23: Main outcome families when controlling for baseline imbalances
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
General utilization 0.000 0.097 0.106 0.087 4451
(1.000) (0.033)∗∗∗ (0.035)∗∗∗ (0.039)∗∗
[0.036]∗∗ [0.014]∗∗ [0.080]∗
Maternal utilization index 0.000 0.060 0.178 −0.059 878
(1.000) (0.070) (0.081)∗∗ (0.082)
[0.277] [0.083]∗ [0.473]
Health outcomes index 0.000 0.082 0.170 −0.010 5003
(1.000) (0.050) (0.056)∗∗∗ (0.058)
[0.188] [0.014]∗∗ [0.909]
Satisfaction index 0.000 0.110 0.094 0.124 5002
(1.000) (0.044)∗∗ (0.051)∗ (0.049)∗∗
[0.060]∗ [0.134] [0.072]∗
Health service delivery index 0.000 0.055 0.082 0.044 2845
(1.000) (0.061) (0.074) (0.063)
[0.277] [0.330] [0.473]
Clinic quality index 0.000 0.151 0.057 0.260 254
(1.000) (0.157) (0.183) (0.184)
[0.277] [0.606] [0.290]
CDPE index 0.000 0.161 0.153 0.168 501
(1.000) (0.086)∗ (0.104) (0.101)∗
[0.145] [0.203] [0.208]
Contributions to clinic index 0.000 0.024 0.044 0.002 501
(1.000) (0.097) (0.113) (0.111)
[0.678] [0.606] [0.969]
Water and sanitation index 0.000 0.122 0.069 0.177 5003
(1.000) (0.062)∗∗ (0.071) (0.071)∗∗
[0.145] [0.330] [0.072]∗
Economic outcomes index 0.000 0.057 0.063 0.051 5003
(1.000) (0.051) (0.060) (0.061)
[0.277] [0.330] [0.473]
Notes: Treatment effects are estimated using Missing-Indicator ANCOVA, controlling for the community-level average of the
outcome family index at baseline and matching-triplet fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by clinic, are shown in
parentheses. Multiple-inference corrected q-values that adjust for the false discovery rate within treatment arm are shown in
square brackets.We also control for baseline variables displaying imbalance in Table C.1 – namely, phone coverage, household
size, the number of births in the household in the last year, the share of the village population of Temne ethnicity, the highest
level of educational attainment, whether they believe what the doctors tell them, and the number of illness or injury cases in the
household. Where imbalanced baseline characteristics are measured at a different level of observation, we average or assign to
each member as needed. Significance: * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and *** is significant at
the 1% level.
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E. Ebola
E.1 Specialized Ebola Facilities and Training
The UN Mission for Emergency Ebola Response (UNMEER) compiled information on three types of treat-
ment facilities:
1. Ebola Treatment Unit (ETU): 17 facilities with an average of 32 beds;
2. Ebola Holding Center (EHC): 49 facilities with an average of 18 beds; and
3. Community Care Center (CCC): 41 facilities with an average of 10 beds
Figure E.1: Location of Ebola Treatment Facilities
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
7°N
7.5°N
8°N
8.5°N
9°N
9.5°N
10°N
13°W 12.5°W 12°W 11.5°W 11°W 10.5°W
Type l ETU CCC EHC
(a) UNMEER
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
7°N
7.5°N
8°N
8.5°N
9°N
9.5°N
10°N
13°W 12.5°W 12°W 11.5°W 11°W 10.5°W
Type l CCC EHC ETU
(b) National Ebola Response Center (NERC)
Maps of three types of treatment facilities: Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs), Ebola Holding Centers (EHCs), and Com-
munity Care Centers (CCCs). The plots differ in the source of the information: data on the left come from the National
Ebola Response Center (NERC); the right, from UNMEER. These sources largely overlap, though the NERC data
contains fewer CCCs and more missing geo-coordinates than the UNMEER data. Both datasets were accessed through
the Humanitarian Data Exchange.
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Table E.1: Average Reported Cases in Sections with Specialized Ebola Facilities
Facility Type ETU EHC CCC Any
Total Cases
No Facility 25.2 26.6 27.9 22.6
Facility Present 484.0 126.5 99.6 131.3
Confirmed Cases
No Facility 3.2 3.3 3.6 2.8
Facility Present 62.6 18.5 11.3 17.8
Negative Cases
No Facility 18.1 19.1 20.0 16.2
Facility Present 340.0 92.4 74.0 94.9
Notes: Data on facility locations taken from UNMEER.
Table E.2: Health Care Worker (HCW) Training Schedule
Week Ending HCWs Trained % Total HCWs Trained (4,264)
11/28/2014 2,440 57%
12/05/2014 3,450 81%
12/12/2014 3,980 93%
12/19/2014 4,200 98%
12/26/2014 4,200 98%
Notes: Approximate counts extracted from report, “Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) and Screening of Suspected
Ebola Cases,” p. 4.
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E.2 Effect on Reported Cases by Month
Table E.3: Effect on Total Cases
Control Mean Pooled CM NFA Difference N
09-07 to 09-28 0.093 0.064 0.096 0.04 0.057 640
(0.432) (0.051) (0.085) (0.079) (0.128)
10-05 to 10-26 0.065 0.325 0.393 0.272 0.122 640
(0.298) (0.132)** (0.201)* (0.141)* (0.217)
11-02 to 11-30 0.248 0.16 0.16 0.161 -0.001 800
(0.733) (0.114) (0.155) (0.128) (0.165)
12-07 to 12-28 0.167 0.216 0.109 0.298 -0.189 640
(0.472) (0.087)** (0.109) (0.117)** (0.147)
01-04 to 02-01 0.485 0.055 -0.009 0.105 -0.114 800
(0.932) (0.109) (0.144) (0.127) (0.159)
02-08 to 03-01 0.319 0.287 0.337 0.249 0.088 640
(0.804) (0.158)* (0.237) (0.169) (0.252)
03-08 to 03-29 0.495 0.091 0.231 -0.017 0.248 640
(0.894) (0.133) (0.184) (0.151) (0.206)
04-05 to 04-26 0.329 0.214 0.376 0.089 0.287 640
(0.783) (0.113)* (0.151)** (0.125) (0.16)*
05-03 to 05-10 0.528 0.03 0.062 0.005 0.057 320
(1.045) (0.172) (0.212) (0.21) (0.245)
Notes: Standard errors clustered on section. Treatment effects estimated using OLS including matching-triplet and
week fixed effects. N varies because case counts are recorded weekly, and there can be 4 or 5 weeks within each period.
Significance: *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.
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E.3 Time-series of Confirmed Cases
Figure E.2: Confirmed Cases by Treatment
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(b) Cumulative Counts
Figure E.2(a) plots the time series of confirmed cases by week; bars represent the raw counts. We use the date that
the case was first saved in the VHF, which is available for 96 percent of cases in our sample. Figure E.2(b) graphs the
cumulative count of confirmed cases by treatment group.
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E.4 Effect on Patient Deaths
Table E.4: Effect on Patient Deaths
Dependent variable:
Patient Deaths
(1) (2)
Total Cases in Last 2 Weeks 0.245 0.247
(0.021)∗∗∗ (0.021)∗∗∗
Pooled 0.063
(0.032)∗∗
Total Cases in Last 2 Weeks × Pooled −0.098
(0.043)∗∗
CM 0.116
(0.037)∗∗∗
Total Cases in Last 2 Weeks × CM −0.149
(0.046)∗∗∗
NFA −0.007
(0.025)
Total Cases in Last 2 Weeks × NFA −0.019
(0.032)
Control Mean 0.149 0.149
(0.49) (0.49)
Observations 5,280 5,280
Notes: Standard errors clustered on section. Treatment effects estimated using OLS including matching-triplet and
week fixed effects. Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.
Table E.5: Effect on Delays between Symptom Onset and Reporting
Control Mean Pooled CM NFA Difference N
Delay: Symptom Onset and Reporting 4.729 0.218 0.583 -0.066 0.649 160
(3.229) (0.51) (0.62) (0.579) (0.626)
Notes: Treatment effects estimated using OLS including matching-triplet fixed effects. Significance: *p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, and *** p < 0.01. Delays greater than 60 days were removed to limit the influence of outliers.
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E.5 Effect on Probable and Suspected Cases
During the study period from September 2014 until April 2015, there are 19 probable and 134 suspected
cases. The VHF uses the following criteria to classify probable and suspected cases:
• Probable (unconfirmed) cases are suspected cases that meet one of two additional criteria: (1) they
were screened by a clinician; or (2) deceased individuals with an epidemiological link with a con-
firmed case. In our sample and study period, there are 19 probable cases.
• Suspected cases include (1) the onset of high fever and contact with a suspected, probable, or con-
firmed individuals or a dead or sick animal; (2) the onset of high fever and at least three of the fol-
lowing symptoms: headaches, vomiting, anorexia/loss of appetite, diarrhea, lethargy, stomach pain,
aching muscles or joints, difficulty swallowing, breathing difficulties, or hiccup; any person with in-
explicable bleeding; or any sudden, inexplicable death. In our sample and study period, there are 134
suspected cases.
Figure E.3: Weekly Counts of Probable and Suspected Cases by Treatment
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The time series of probable and suspected cases by week; bars represent the raw counts. We use the date that the case
was first saved in the VHF.
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Table E.6: Effect on Probable and Suspected Cases
Control Mean Pooled CM NFA Difference N
Ebola Cases
Probable and Suspected 0.029 0.003 0.015 -0.007 0.022 5,440
(0.208) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011)*
Log(Ebola Cases + 1)
Probable and Suspected 0.018 0.002 0.009 -0.004 0.013 5,440
(0.123) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)*
Linear Probability Model
Probable and Suspected 0.022 0.002 0.011 -0.005 0.016 5,440
(0.148) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)*
IHS(Ebola Cases)
Probable and Suspected 0.023 0.002 0.012 -0.005 0.017 5,440
(0.159) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)*
Notes: Standard errors clustered on section shown in parentheses. Treatment effects estimated using OLS including
matching-triplet and week fixed effects. Significance: *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.
Table E.7: Effect on Reported Cases (Removing Probable and Suspected)
Control Mean Pooled CM NFA Difference N
Ebola Cases
Total 0.252 0.17 0.188 0.155 0.033 5,440
(0.672) (0.08)** (0.11)* (0.094) (0.127)
IHS(Ebola Cases)
Total 1.004 0.057 0.061 0.053 0.007 5,440
(0.292) (0.028)** (0.037)* (0.033) (0.042)
Notes: The sample includes 160 sections over 34 weeks. Standard errors clustered on section shown in parentheses.
Treatment effects estimated using OLS including matching-triplet and week fixed effects. Difference column reports the
difference between the CM and NFA coefficients; the standard error is computed using the delta method. Significance:
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.
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E.6 Dropping Triplets
Figure E.4: Estimates Dropping Each Triplet from Sample
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We re-estimate Equation 3 dropping one triplet (i.e., block) from the sample with each iteration. Figure E.4(a): distri-
bution of coefficient estimates. Figure E.4(b): distribution of t-statistics.
Figure E.5: Estimates Dropping Each Pair of Triplets from Sample
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We re-estimate Equation 3 dropping pairs of triplets (i.e., block) from the sample with each iteration. Figure E.4(a):
distribution of coefficient estimates. Figure E.4(b): distribution of t-statistics.
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E.7 Dropping Weeks
Figure E.6: Estimates Dropping Each Week from Sample
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We re-estimate Equation 3 dropping one week from the sample with each iteration. Figure E.6(a): distribution of
coefficient estimates. Figure E.6(b): distribution of t-statistics.
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E.8 Alternative Functional Forms for Reported Cases
Table E.8: Effect on Reported Cases (Alternative Specifications)
Control Mean Pooled CM NFA Difference N
Linear Probability Model
Total 0.182 0.047 0.057 0.039 0.018 5,440
(0.386) (0.026)* (0.034)* (0.031) (0.038)
Confirmed 0.009 0.021 0.022 0.02 0.002 5,440
(0.096) (0.007)*** (0.01)** (0.008)*** (0.011)
Negative 0.164 0.038 0.038 0.037 0.002 5,440
(0.371) (0.024) (0.03) (0.029) (0.034)
Log(Ebola Cases + 1)
Total 0.16 0.065 0.074 0.057 0.017 5,440
(0.363) (0.033)* (0.044)* (0.039) (0.05)
Confirmed 0.007 0.023 0.027 0.019 0.008 5,440
(0.077) (0.008)*** (0.012)** (0.009)** (0.013)
Negative 0.139 0.045 0.04 0.049 -0.008 5,440
(0.335) (0.027)* (0.034) (0.033) (0.04)
Poisson
Total 0.281 0.469 0.552 0.407 0.144 5,440
(0.727) (0.213)** (0.286)* (0.25) (0.322)
Confirmed 0.011 1.669 2.008 1.369 0.639 5,440
(0.129) (0.513)*** (0.58)*** (0.569)** (0.5)
Negative 0.238 0.342 0.276 0.389 -0.113 5,440
(0.648) (0.201)* (0.268) (0.234)* (0.3)
Notes: Standard errors clustered on section. Treatment effects estimated using OLS including matching-triplet and
week fixed effects. Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
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E.9 Extending Panel to August 2014
Table E.9: Effect on Reported Cases in Extended Panel (August 2014–April 2015)
Control Mean Pooled CM NFA Difference N
Ebola Cases
Total 0.257 0.163 0.189 0.142 0.048 6,079
(0.706) (0.077)** (0.106)* (0.091) (0.122)
Confirmed 0.014 0.058 0.079 0.041 0.038 6,079
(0.146) (0.022)** (0.034)** (0.025)* (0.038)
Negative 0.216 0.092 0.074 0.105 -0.031 6,079
(0.621) (0.055)* (0.07) (0.068) (0.084)
IHS(Ebola Cases)
Total 0.189 0.078 0.088 0.07 0.018 6,079
(0.454) (0.039)** (0.052)* (0.046) (0.059)
Confirmed 0.011 0.028 0.032 0.025 0.007 6,079
(0.109) (0.01)*** (0.014)** (0.011)** (0.016)
Negative 0.163 0.054 0.048 0.058 -0.01 6,079
(0.415) (0.032)* (0.04) (0.039) (0.047)
Notes: Standard errors clustered on section. We drop a single outlying observation from Konjo Njeigor for the week
of August 24, 2014, which is 25 times larger than any other weekly total from that section and 5 times larger than any
other observation in the full time-series. Konjo Njeigor is a CM section, so removing this observation only depresses
the pooled and CM treatment effects. Treatment effects estimated using OLS including matching-triplet and week fixed
effects. Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.
A41
E.10 Cross-sectional Results for Reported Cases
Table E.10: Effect on Reported Cases (Cross-Sectional)
Control Mean Pooled CM NFA Difference N
Ebola Cases
Total 9.537 5.868 6.925 5.047 1.878 160
(12.462) (4.086) (4.992) (4.661) (5.037)
Confirmed 0.389 2.012 2.909 1.315 1.594 160
(1.235) (1.197)* (1.453)** (1.357) (1.467)
Negative 8.093 3.383 2.689 3.922 -1.233 160
(10.617) (2.916) (3.563) (3.327) (3.595)
Log(Ebola Cases + 1)
Total 1.798 0.294 0.417 0.198 0.219 160
(1.11) (0.214) (0.26) (0.243) (0.262)
Confirmed 0.171 0.38 0.413 0.354 0.059 160
(0.456) (0.141)*** (0.172)** (0.161)** (0.174)
Negative 1.674 0.227 0.348 0.133 0.215 160
(1.07) (0.202) (0.245) (0.229) (0.247)
Linear Probability Model
Total 0.833 0.072 0.091 0.057 0.034 160
(0.376) (0.062) (0.076) (0.071) (0.076)
Confirmed 0.148 0.251 0.234 0.265 -0.03 160
(0.359) (0.082)*** (0.101)** (0.094)*** (0.102)
Negative 0.833 0.048 0.096 0.011 0.086 160
(0.376) (0.067) (0.081) (0.076) (0.082)
IHS(Ebola Cases)
Total 2.242 0.335 0.484 0.22 0.264 160
(1.328) (0.25) (0.304) (0.284) (0.307)
Confirmed 0.221 0.474 0.505 0.45 0.055 160
(0.587) (0.173)*** (0.212)** (0.198)** (0.214)
Negative 2.097 0.264 0.424 0.14 0.285 160
(1.291) (0.239) (0.291) (0.271) (0.293)
Poisson
Total 9.537 0.469 0.552 0.407 0.144 160
(12.462) (0.056)*** (0.066)*** (0.062)*** (0.062)**
Confirmed 0.389 1.669 2.008 1.369 0.639 160
(1.235) (0.231)*** (0.244)*** (0.245)*** (0.152)***
Negative 8.093 0.342 0.276 0.389 -0.113 160
(10.617) (0.062)*** (0.075)*** (0.069)*** (0.073)
Notes: Treatment effects estimated using OLS including matching-triplet fixed effects. Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, and *** p < 0.01
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Figure E.7: Cross-sectional Differences in Confirmed Cases
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Figure E.7(a): empirical CDF of reported, confirmed cases (logged) for control (grey) and treated (black) sections.
Figure E.7(b): average number of reported, confirmed cases (logged) for control and treated sections. These means do
not account for the blocking.
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E.11 Dose-response Models
Table E.11: Dose-Response with All Sections in Study Area
Total Total per Clinic Total per 1k
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proportion of Clinics Treated 0.173∗∗ 0.159∗ 0.165∗∗ 0.169∗∗ 0.052∗ 0.053∗
(0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.082) (0.031) (0.031)
Population (1000s) 0.059∗∗∗
(0.016)
Number of Clinics 0.074∗∗∗
(0.015)
Confirmed Confirmed per Clinic Confirmed per 1k
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proportion of Clinics Treated 0.059∗∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.015∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.006) (0.006)
Population (1000s) 0.007
(0.005)
Number of Clinics 0.008∗∗
(0.003)
Ebola Sample X
Full Sample X X X X X
Sections 160 205 205 205 205 205
Observations 5,440 6,970 6,970 6,970 6,970 6,970
Notes: Standard errors clustered on section. Treatment effects estimated using OLS including matching-triplet and
week fixed effects. Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.
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E.12 Placebo Test with Nearest Neighboring Out-of-sample Sections
We calculate the distances between the centroid of a section in the sample and all out-of-sample sections.
We then use the minimum distance to identify the nearest neighbor.
Table E.12: Placebo: Reported Cases using Nearest Neighboring Section
Control Mean Pooled CM NFA Difference N
Ebola Cases
Total 0.222 0.057 0.043 0.069 -0.026 5,440
(0.957) (0.063) (0.076) (0.072) (0.078)
Confirmed 0.029 0.01 0.001 0.016 -0.015 5,440
(0.371) (0.023) (0.03) (0.027) (0.033)
Negative 0.169 0.042 0.033 0.049 -0.015 5,440
(0.653) (0.04) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047)
IHS(Ebola Cases)
Total 0.153 0.041 0.033 0.048 -0.015 5,440
(0.419) (0.031) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
Confirmed 0.018 0.008 0.004 0.012 -0.009 5,440
(0.164) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017)
Negative 0.125 0.032 0.024 0.038 -0.013 5,440
(0.37) (0.025) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
Notes: Standard errors clustered on section. Treatment effects estimated using OLS including matching-triplet and
week fixed effects. Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. The three major cities in our study districts
(Bo Town, Kenema Town, and Makeni Town) are excluded as potential nearest neighbors.
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E.13 Baseline Balance in Ebola Sample
Table E.13: Baseline Balance (Ebola sub-sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control
Mean CM NFA Difference N
Village characteristics
Motorable road 0.891 0.108 0.045 0.063 318
(0.313) (0.059)∗ (0.050) (0.055)
Mobile phone coverage 0.812 0.078 0.174 −0.096 318
(0.392) (0.076) (0.058)∗∗∗ (0.065)
Distance to the closest clinic 1.362 0.338 0.909 −0.571 318
(2.217) (0.532) (0.905) (0.505)
Travel cost to closest clinic 94.225 −29.666 −46.167 16.501 317
(869.677) (132.127) (124.628) (102.778)
Household characteristics and questions to household head
Household size 3.369 −0.038 0.016 −0.053 6225
(2.979) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
Number of illness or injury cases per household 0.054 −0.021 −0.013 −0.009 6225
(0.237) (0.009)∗∗ (0.009) (0.009)
Birth in household last year 0.157 −0.024 0.011 −0.035 1582
(0.363) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)∗
Child under 2 in household 0.230 −0.025 0.001 −0.026 1581
(0.421) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025)
Prominent village member in household 0.042 −0.019 −0.016 −0.003 1574
(0.200) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Believes doctor’s advice 0.995 −0.001 −0.005 0.004 1452
(0.072) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Health care fees unaffordable 2.307 −0.005 0.070 −0.075 1521
(0.784) (0.069) (0.068) (0.074)
Trust in the community 1.856 −0.129 −0.054 −0.075 1581
(0.663) (0.063)∗∗ (0.057) (0.070)
Community cohesion 2.420 0.017 0.025 −0.009 1577
(0.610) (0.045) (0.048) (0.051)
Believe VHC members represent your interest 2.743 −0.117 −0.174 0.057 704
(1.061) (0.122) (0.123) (0.113)
The VHC can be trusted 2.453 −0.121 0.026 −0.148 843
(0.967) (0.120) (0.107) (0.122)
Individual characteristics
Muslim 0.854 0.000 0.001 −0.001 7128
(0.353) (0.040) (0.034) (0.045)
Mende (Ethnicity) 0.418 −0.029 0.011 −0.040 7127
(0.493) (0.017)∗ (0.016) (0.018)∗∗
Temne (Ethnicity) 0.348 0.104 0.121 −0.018 7127
(0.476) (0.056)∗ (0.048)∗∗ (0.056)
Highest level of education 2.920 0.054 0.780 −0.726 7106
(4.203) (0.176) (0.161)∗∗∗ (0.180)∗∗∗
Notes: This table illustrates the baseline balance across the three treatment arms (control, community monitoring
and non-financial awards). Column (1) shows the characteristics of the control group at baseline (mean and standard
deviation). Columns (2) and (3) indicate the regression coefficients and standard errors of the CM and NFA treatment
arms compared to the control group. Column (4) compares the two treatment arms. Significance: * is significant at the
10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and *** is significant at the 1% level.
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E.14 Results for Pre-specified Families in Ebola Sample
Table E.14: Pre-specified Families in Ebola Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
General utilization 0.000 0.074 0.128 0.036 2857
(1.000) (0.040)∗ (0.049)∗∗∗ (0.042)
[0.188] [0.110] [0.397]
Maternal utilization index 0.000 0.058 0.232 −0.055 595
(1.000) (0.086) (0.112)∗∗ (0.097)
[0.379] [0.143] [0.488]
Health outcomes index 0.000 0.034 0.085 −0.006 3183
(1.000) (0.062) (0.069) (0.074)
[0.379] [0.283] [0.886]
Satisfaction index 0.000 0.108 0.106 0.109 3183
(1.000) (0.055)∗ (0.068) (0.061)∗
[0.188] [0.235] [0.144]
Health service delivery index 0.000 −0.056 −0.033 −0.064 1819
(1.000) (0.066) (0.088) (0.070)
[0.329] [0.459] [0.397]
Clinic quality index 0.000 0.311 −0.023 0.565 160
(1.000) (0.236) (0.301) (0.264)∗∗
[0.205] [0.459] [0.144]
CDPE index 0.000 0.264 0.232 0.288 320
(1.000) (0.108)∗∗ (0.155) (0.132)∗∗
[0.188] [0.235] [0.144]
Contributions to clinic index 0.000 0.173 0.292 0.080 320
(1.000) (0.127) (0.142)∗∗ (0.148)
[0.205] [0.143] [0.488]
Water and sanitation index 0.000 0.167 0.137 0.190 3183
(1.000) (0.086)∗ (0.101) (0.096)∗
[0.188] [0.264] [0.144]
Economic outcomes index 0.000 0.151 0.065 0.219 3183
(1.000) (0.087)∗ (0.106) (0.105)∗∗
[0.188] [0.425] [0.144]
Notes: Treatment effects are estimated using Missing-Indicator ANCOVA, controlling for the community-level average of the
outcome family index at baseline and matching-triplet fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by clinic, are shown in
parentheses. Multiple-inference corrected q-values that adjust for the false discovery rate within treatment arm are shown in
square brackets. Significance: * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and *** is significant at the 1%
level.
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E.15 Perceived Quality of Care
Table E.15: Perceived quality of care
Control
Mean Pooled CM NFA N
General utilization 0.972 0.026 0.048 0.010 2857
(0.398) (0.015)∗ (0.018)∗∗∗ (0.016)
Satisfaction with public health workers 3.301 0.103 0.100 0.105 3149
(0.779) (0.036)∗∗∗ (0.048)∗∗ (0.040)∗∗
Relative effectiveness of western medicine −0.378 0.060 0.070 0.053 3183
(0.205) (0.025)∗∗ (0.033)∗∗ (0.027)∗
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by clinic. Treatment effects are estimated using
Missing Indicator ANCOVA, controlling for the outcome family index at baseline at the community level, and including matching-
triplet fixed effects. Significance: * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and *** is significant at the 1%
level.
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E.16 Surveillance
The WHO defines contact tracing as: “identification and follow-up of persons who may have come into
contact with a person infected with the Ebola virus.”A6
Table E.16: Contact Tracing among Confirmed Patients by Treatment
Proportion among Contacts
Treatment Total Traced Proportion Traced Family Outside
Control 17 0.59 0.50 0.50
CM 55 0.22 0.61 0.39
NFA 28 0.24 0.57 0.43
Notes: Total Traced (column 2) counts the number of cases subject to contact tracing across the treatment arms. Pro-
portion traced then divides this number by the total number of confirmed cases. In the final two columns, we restrict
attention to cases subject to contact tracing and compute the proportion of contacts from the patients’ family or outside
their family. Family here includes individuals within the nuclear family, e.g., parents, children, siblings.
Table E.17: Effect on Surveillance Proxies
Control Mean Pooled CM NFA Difference N
Pr(Lab Test) 0.926 0.012 0.018 0.008 0.01 144
(0.099) (0.016) (0.02) (0.018) (0.02)
Delay: Report - Lab 5.029 -2.874 -3.072 -2.72 -0.352 160
(16.915) (1.978) (2.419) (2.259) (2.441)
Log(Case Workers + 1) 1.672 0.125 0.134 0.117 0.016 160
(0.952) (0.18) (0.221) (0.206) (0.223)
Notes: Treatment effects estimated using OLS including matching-triplet fixed effects. Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, and *** p < 0.01
A6 https://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/ebola/contact-tracing-guidelines/en/
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E.17 Ebola-specific Balance Tests
Table E.18: Balance: Specialized Ebola Facilities
Control Mean Pooled CM NFA N
NERC
Total 0.056 -0.03 -0.054 -0.011 160
(0.231) (0.042) (0.051) (0.048)
EHC 0.019 0.006 -0.016 0.023 160
(0.136) (0.033) (0.04) (0.037)
CCC 0.019 -0.018 -0.027 -0.011 160
(0.136) (0.021) (0.026) (0.024)
Beds 0.463 -0.18 -0.66 0.194 160
(2.044) (0.493) (0.596) (0.556)
UNMEER
Total 0.093 0.03 0.024 0.035 160
(0.293) (0.065) (0.079) (0.074)
EHC 0.019 -0.012 -0.013 -0.011 160
(0.136) (0.029) (0.035) (0.033)
CCC 0.056 0.06 0.048 0.069 160
(0.231) (0.056) (0.068) (0.064)
Beds 0.759 0.347 0.351 0.345 160
(2.495) (0.623) (0.762) (0.712)
Notes: Differences estimated using OLS including matching-triplet fixed effects. Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
and *** p < 0.01
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Table E.19: Balance: Minimum Distance to Specialized Ebola Facilities
Control Mean Pooled CM NFA N
NERC
ETU 33.986 0.588 -1.302 2.056 160
(17.422) (3.795) (4.626) (4.319)
EHC 20.715 -2.034 -0.315 -3.369 160
(11.479) (2.115) (2.563) (2.394)
CCC 49.794 -5.353 -3.257 -6.98 160
(31.244) (4.09) (4.984) (4.654)
UNMEER
ETU 33.57 0.82 -1.156 2.354 160
(17.495) (3.777) (4.602) (4.297)
EHC 20.586 -2.361 -1.105 -3.337 160
(10.445) (2.011) (2.446) (2.284)
CCC 54.163 -7.277 -5.159 -8.921 160
(43.64) (3.819)* (4.651) (4.343)**
Notes: Differences estimated using OLS including matching-triplet fixed effects. Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
and *** p < 0.01
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Table E.20: Balance: Proxies for Exposure
Control Mean Pooled CM NFA N
Dist(Patient Zero in Guinea) 196.354 10.93 8.158 13.083 160
(42.021) (5.079)** (6.186) (5.777)**
Dist(Patient Zero in SL) 91.104 11.627 7.758 14.632 160
(62.208) (6.441)* (7.838) (7.319)**
Primary Road Density 0.007 0.008 -0.012 0.023 160
(0.029) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017)
Secondary Road Density 0.019 0.011 0.013 0.01 160
(0.053) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013)
Tertiary Road Density 0.084 -0.009 0.01 -0.024 160
(0.158) (0.024) (0.029) (0.027)
Notes: Differences estimated using OLS including matching-triplet fixed effects. Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
and *** p < 0.01
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E.18 Spillovers
Table E.21: Spillovers from Bordering Sections
Total IHS(Total)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Pooled 0.173** 0.360** 0.330*** 0.083* 0.179** 0.184***
(0.084) (0.177) (0.113) (0.043) (0.089) (0.059)
Pooled × Bordering Controls -0.134 -0.070
(0.116) (0.060)
Bordering Controls 0.105 0.052
(0.083) (0.044)
Pooled × Bordering Controls Pop.
(1000s)
-0.019 -0.012
(0.021) (0.011)
Bordering Control Pop. (1000s) 0.050** 0.032***
(0.020) (0.010)
Week 34 34 34 34 34 34
Block 81 81 81 81 81 81
N 5,440 5,440 5,440 5,440 5,440 5,440
Notes: Standard errors clustered on section. Treatment effects estimated using OLS including matching-triplet and
week fixed effects. Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.
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Table E.22: Spillovers from Clinic Proximity
Total IHS(Total)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Pooled 0.173** 0.809** 0.083* 0.473**
(0.084) (0.385) (0.043) (0.207)
Pooled × Proximity to Control -0.028* -0.017*
(0.017) (0.009)
Proximity to Control 0.010 0.007
(0.011) (0.006)
Week 34 34 34 34
Block 81 81 81 81
N 5,440 5,440 5,440 5,440
*Notes*: Standard errors clustered on section. Treatment effects estimated using OLS including matching-triplet and
week fixed effects. To compute proximity, we measure the distance (in kilometers) to the nearest control clinic in the
full sample and then reverse the scale of the variable by subtracting off the maximum and multiplying by minus one.
Significance: *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.
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Table E.23: Spillovers through Road Network
Total IHS(Total)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Pooled 0.173** 0.177 0.083* 0.099*
(0.084) (0.114) (0.043) (0.056)
Pooled × Connected Controls 0.026 0.011
(0.025) (0.013)
Connected Controls 0.001** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Week 34 34 34 34
Block 81 81 81 81
N 5,440 5,440 5,440 5,440
Notes: Standard errors clustered on section. Treatment effects estimated using OLS including matching-triplet and
week fixed effects. Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.
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Table E.24: Spillovers from Proximate Coethnic Sections
Total IHS(Total)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Pooled 0.173** 0.243** 0.083* 0.123**
(0.084) (0.117) (0.043) (0.058)
Pooled × Co-ethnic Controls w/in 10 km -0.170 -0.090
(0.111) (0.061)
Co-ethnic Controls w/in 10 km 0.120 0.056
(0.083) (0.048)
Week 34 34 34 34
Block 81 81 81 81
N 5,440 5,440 5,440 5,440
Notes: Standard errors clustered on section. Treatment effects estimated using OLS including matching-triplet and
week fixed effects. Significance: *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.
Figure E.8: Roads Intersecting Control Sections
Control
Treatment
Black Paths: Roads and paths intersecting control sections
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E.19 Ratio of Confirmed and Total Cases
Figure E.9: Ratio of Confirmed to Total Cases
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Figure E.9(a) computes the ratio of confirmed to total cases for each section-week and then average across treatment
and control. If there are no cases in a section-week, the ratio is undefined. The ribbons at the top of the plot display the
averages when we impute 1 for those undefined observations; the ribbons at the bottom display the averages when we
instead impute 0. Figure E.9(b) computes the ratio of confirmed to confirmed plus negative cases. If there the sum of
confirmed and negative cases is zero in a section-week, the ratio is undefined. The ribbons at the top of the plot display
the averages when we impute 1 for those undefined observations; the ribbons at the bottom display the averages when
we instead impute 0. In both figures, the shaded areas connect the 95% confidence intervals around these proportions.
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E.20 Bounding Exercise: Unintended Increase
Data on Ebola incidence in Sierra Leone is incomplete. As such, we cannot directly rule out an increase
in exposure by comparing the total number of cases in treatment and control areas. To be a confirmed
case in the available Ebola data, an individual must be infected with Ebola and known to health workers
through self-reporting or surveillance. CM and NFA could theoretically affect case counts by unintentionally
increasing either exposure rates, reporting propensities, or both. We use our empirical results and a simple
model to clarify what must be assumed to attribute our results to changes in exposure.
Sequence and Information
Each individual i observes whether they are symptomatic, s ∈ {0,1}. The CDC lists the following as Ebola
symptoms: fever, severe headache, muscle pain, weakness or fatigue, diarrhea, vomiting abdominal pain, or
unexplained hemorrhage. They also observe the treatment status of their local health facility, T ∈ {0,1}.
i knows that Pr[s = 1 | I = 1] = 1: if you have Ebola, you will show symptoms. They also know
that Pr[s = 1 | I = 0] = p ∈ (0,1), i.e., that symptoms like fevers and diarrhea happen to those that are not
infected.A7 The infection rates within control and treatment communities, eT = E(I | T ), are also common
knowledge.
i must to decide whether to report their symptoms and be tested, R ∈ {0,1}. They cannot, however,
condition this decision on their actual infection status, because this is not known to i prior to testing.
Notation
• Reporting among Symptomatic in Control: Pr(R | s = 1,T = 0) = h ∈ [0,1]
• Reporting among Symptomatic in Treatment: Pr(R | s = 1,T = 1) = min{hτh,1} where τh ∈ R1+
• Reporting among Asymptomatic in Control: Pr(R | s = 0,T = 0) = l ∈ [0,1]
• Reporting among Asymptomatic in Treatment: Pr(R | s = 0,T = 1) = min{lτl,1} where τl ∈ R1+
We assume l ≤ h (i.e., individuals with symptoms are more likely to report than those without). To
minimize terms, we define d = l/h. This is the ratio of reporting probabilities of asymptomatic to symp-
tomatic individuals in control areas. d = 0.5, for example, implies that symptomatic individuals in control
areas are twice as likely to report as those displaying no symptoms.
A7This is likely a considerable proportion of Sierra Leone’s population: the WHO, for example, cites a 2011 assessment which
found that 24 percent of children under 5 had malaria in the two weeks prior to the survey. Over months, the probability of flu-like
symptoms due to illnesses unrelated to Ebola is quite likely.
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Logic
We estimate the percentage difference in confirmed cases between treatment and control β where:
E[R∗ I | T = 1] = β E[R∗ I | T = 0] (4)
β =
e1
e0
τh = E τh
where E is the effect of the treatment on exposure to Ebola. This estimate could confound the effect of the
treatment on exposure E and reporting τh by symptomatic individuals.
In the cross-sectional results, we estimate β̂ ≈ 1.4. If we make the extreme assumption that treatment
has no impact on the reporting decisions of symptomatic individuals (τh→ 1), then β reflects the different
rates of exposure in treatment and control areas. Conversely, as τh → β , the possible treatment effect on
exposure attenuates to zero (E → 1).
Second, we find that the ratio of confirmed to total cases does not differ with treatment status:
E[R∗ I | T = 1]
E[R | T = 1] =
E[R∗ I | T = 0]
E[R | T = 0]
Rearranging equation (1) and substituting,
β =
E[R | T = 1]
E[R | T = 0]
This implies
τl = τh
(
E d(1− e0)(1− p)+ p(E −1)
d(1− e1)(1− p)
)
and
E = β/τh
If treatment increased exposure, then it must have also increased reporting among asymptomatic indi-
viduals, such that the ratio of confirmed to total cases is not elevated in treated areas.
Using these two equations, we vary the parameters {τh, p,d} over plausible ranges and compute the
implied increases in exposure (E ) and reporting among asymptomatic individuals (τl). We set β = β̂ ≈ 1.4
and e1 = 0.01.A8 This exercise clarifies what we must be true for the treatment to increase communities’
exposure to Ebola (E > 1) and still produce our empirical results:
• There is some pathway whereby treatment increased exposure.
• τh < β . As τh→ β , the potential positive effect on exposure attenuates to zero (i.e., E → 1).
• τh < τl . Treatment must have had a larger effect on reporting among those without symptoms.
A8The exact value of e1 is not consequential at low values of e1. We do not need to set e0, as this is equal to βτh/e1.
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• This differential effect (τl/τh) must be larger when d is smaller or p is larger. If baseline reporting is
much lower among asymptomatic individuals and/or Ebola symptoms are common among uninfected
individuals, then τl/τh must be large.
Numerical Examples
Suppose that individuals with no symptoms report 25 percent as often as those with symptoms (d = 0.25)
and that 25 percent of individuals display flu-like symptoms over the course of several months even when
uninfected (p= 0.25). If treatment has no effect on reporting among symptomatic individuals (τh = 1), then
the 40 percent increase in exposure would have to be accompanied by roughly two times as much reporting
by individuals with no symptoms (τl = 1.94). If treatment led to a 20 percent increase in reporting among
those with symptoms (τh = 1.2), then exposure can only increase by 16 percent, and τl must reach 1.67.
Table E.25: Implied E and τl
p d τh τl E
0.25 0.25 1.00 1.94 1.40
0.50 0.25 1.00 3.02 1.40
0.25 0.50 1.00 1.67 1.40
0.50 0.50 1.00 2.21 1.40
0.25 0.25 1.20 1.67 1.17
0.50 0.25 1.20 2.21 1.17
0.25 0.50 1.20 1.54 1.17
0.50 0.50 1.20 1.81 1.17
For reasonable choices of p and d, we find these scenarios unlikely. First, in our NFA treatment, there is
no plausible pathway whereby treatment increased exposure. Even in CM areas, the last planned community
meeting took place a year prior to the Ebola outbreak.
Second, these imply large treatment effects and high relative rates of reporting among individuals with
no symptoms to report. One cannot preemptively test for Ebola — the virus can only be detected days
after symptoms begin. There is no reason for asymptomatic individuals to report, and widespread fear that
deterred the use of health facilities even among those in desperate need of medical care. Elston et al. (2016,
675) report reductions in hospital attendance during the Ebola crisis in Sierra Leone, including significantly
lower numbers of “women admitted during labor, urgent paediatric hospital admissions including children
hospitalized with malaria and outpatient consultations.”
Third, ceiling effects are unlikely. One might be concerned that h is close to 1. In that case, there
is less room for treatment to affect reporting among those displaying symptoms, as hτh ≤ 1. However, the
CDC forecasts used an underreporting factor of 2.5 for Sierra Leone and Liberia based on expert opinions.A9
(This would correspond to h = 0.4 in our terms.) This implies that τh could be as large as 2.5 before hitting
any ceiling effects. We can rule out any increase in exposure when τh ≥ 1.4. Qualitative evidence stresses
underreporting as a major concern during Sierra Leone’s Ebola crisis. This implies that many symptomatic
A9https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/other/su6303.pdf
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individuals were failing to seek care and, thus, might have changed their decision as a consequence of
treatment.
The data do not allow us to rule out an increase in exposure. However, to reconcile this explanation with
our pattern of results requires behavioral responses among asymptomatic individuals that we find difficult
to believe.
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E.21 Controlling for Unbalanced Baseline Variables
Covariates included (all measured as proportions of households): (1) beyond primary education, (2) Mende,
(3) ill in last month, and (4) own mobile phone.
Table E.26: Effects on Reported Cases Controlling for Unbalanced Baseline Variables
Control Mean Pooled CM NFA Difference N
Ebola Cases
Total 0.281 0.191 0.153 0.23 -0.077 5,440
(0.727) (0.086)** (0.103) (0.101)** (0.112)
Confirmed 0.011 0.068 0.07 0.067 0.002 5,440
(0.129) (0.027)** (0.031)** (0.029)** (0.027)
Negative 0.238 0.105 0.056 0.153 -0.098 5,440
(0.648) (0.063)* (0.076) (0.078)** (0.089)
IHS(Ebola Cases)
Total 0.206 0.096 0.082 0.11 -0.029 5,440
(0.47) (0.043)** (0.053) (0.051)** (0.059)
Confirmed 0.009 0.033 0.029 0.037 -0.007 5,440
(0.1) (0.011)*** (0.013)** (0.013)*** (0.013)
Negative 0.179 0.066 0.047 0.086 -0.038 5,440
(0.433) (0.036)* (0.045) (0.043)** (0.051)
Notes: Standard errors clustered on section. Treatment effects estimated using OLS including matching-triplet and
week fixed effects. Covariates included (all measured as proportions of households): (1) beyond primary education, (2)
Mende, (3) ill in last month, and (4) own mobile phone. Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.
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E.22 Geo-coding Procedure
The VHF data includes information on individuals’ residences, including their district, chiefdom, and village
or parish. We use this information to place observations within sections. Our geo-location protocol involves
several steps. First, a human coder inspected and cleaned all district and chiefdom names that did not exactly
match the conventional spelling. Of 85,410 entries in the case data, we can code the chiefdom of residence
for 97% of observations.
Second, we employ fuzzy string matching to match the available village or parish names to gazetteer
files of placenames from Sierra Leone. Fortunately, in the chiefdoms that include our sample, only 14 con-
firmed, suspected, or probable Ebola cases do not include village or parish information.A10 We employ the
gazetteer file from Open Street Map (www.openstreetmap.org/), which includes 9,975 entries, ranging
from hamlets to cities. We prefer this list to the 2004 census data from Sierra Leone, which only provides
names for around 5,000 localities. Moreover, during the Ebola epidemic, Open Street Map mounted a hu-
manitarian effort aimed at updating and verifying information on the locations of villages and roads in Sierra
Leone.A11
Ten sample entries from OSM gazetteer file:
osm_id name coordinates
1 27565056 Freetown (-13.26802 8.479002)
2 314001434 Bo (-11.73665 7.962065)
3 314005602 Kenema (-11.18639 7.885936)
4 314007819 Koidu (-10.97163 8.642281)
5 320058940 Kambia (-12.91934 9.125073)
6 320060481 Kamakwie (-12.24125 9.496301)
7 320060535 Pujehun (-11.72124 7.356632)
8 320060540 Zimmi (-11.31032 7.312338)
9 370327499 Goderich (-13.28887 8.432966)
10 370495828 Murray Town (-13.26534 8.491613)
Fuzzy string matching calculates the string distance between each village or parish name in the VHF
data and each placename in the gazetteer file that falls within the exact same district and chiefdom.A12 An
exact match returns a distance of zero; “FREE TOWN” and “FREETOWN,” for example, would return a
distance of 1. We do not match any entries with a string distance that exceeds 2.
While the geo-coding process introduces measurement error, we expect this is uncorrelated with treat-
ment and, thus, only going to attenuate our estimates. To bolster this assumption, we look at whether pla-
cenames in the gazetteer file tend to be more numerous or longer in treated versus control sections. We see
no indication that treated sections have significantly more or shorter placenames; moreover, the placenames
are not more likely to contain a space between words (see Table E.27).
A10 Of all entries in the case data that fall within the chiefdoms the include our sample, only 0.07 percent are missing an entry for
village or parish of residence.
A11 http://wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/2014_West_Africa_Ebola_Response
A12 We use optimal string alignment distance, a variant of the Levenshtein distance, which is commonly employed in geo-coding
algorithms.
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Table E.27: Balance: Placenames for Geocoding
Control Mean Pooled CM NFA N
Number of Places 8.056 1.096 0.721 1.387 160
(6.456) (1.303) (1.592) (1.487)
Number of Placenames 7.222 0.856 0.651 1.016 160
(5.709) (1.304) (1.594) (1.489)
Average Length of Placenames 6.443 0.021 0.085 -0.029 160
(1.945) (0.3) (0.367) (0.343)
Proportion of Placenames with Whitespace 0.033 -0.004 -0.008 0 160
(0.114) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017)
Notes: Differences estimated using OLS including matching-triplet fixed effects. Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
and *** p < 0.01
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E.23 Calculating Reduction in R0
R0 is the reproduction rate of a disease: the average number of secondary cases generated by the average
infectious individual. To calculate the implied reduction in R0 due to our treatments we follow the approach
of Pronyk et al. (2016), which the authors detail in their online appendix.A13 R0 is calculated by multiplying
the disease transmission rate by the average duration of infectiousness, D≥ 0. The duration of infectiousness
is time during which an infected patient can spread disease.
We adopt Pronyk et al.’s (2016) assumption that transmission rates do not change following public
health interventions (in their case the construction of Community Care Centers). Conditional on a infected
individual and susceptible individual coming into contact, the likelihood that Ebola is transmitted between
the two is unaffected by treatment. Granting this assumption, treatment can affect R0 by changing D(T ),
which is calculated as follows:
D(T ) = t(T )r(T )+10[1− r(T )]
where t(T ) is the time between symptom onset and isolation among individuals who are isolated; r(T ), the
proportion of individuals who are isolated; and T is a binary treatment indicator. If an individual does not
report, Pronyk et al. (2016) assume they remain infectious for 10 days.
The average time between symptom onset and reporting — t(T = 1) and t(T = 0) — can be calculated
from data. In our sample, t(T = 0) = 4.73 and t(T = 1) = 4.97; we cannot reject the null that these are
equal (see Table E.5).
Pronyk et al. (2016) assume a baseline reporting rate of 50 percent from mid-November to January,
which is also the period that the disease was a major threat in our study area. 50 percent is consistent with
other estimates, though it may understate the extent of under-reporting; the CDC’s initial estimate was 40
percent.A14 Going forward, assume r(T = 0) = 0.5 and r(T = 1) = r(T = 0) · τ .
Assuming the (initial) stock of Ebola cases is balanced across treatment and control, then τ = y(T =
1)/y(T = 0), where y(T ) is the number of reported cases and can be calculated from our data. Our estimates
in Table 3 imply that τ̂ = (0.281+0.173)/(0.281) = 1.62.
With these quantities in hand, we can calculate D(T ):
D(T = 0) = (4.72)(0.5)+10[1− (0.5)] = 7.46
D(T = 1) = (4.97)(0.5 ·1.62)+10[1− (0.5 ·1.62)] = 5.93
This implies that treatment generated a 19 percent reduction in R0. Pronyk et al. (2016) estimate that CCCs
contributed to a 13–32 percent reduction in R0.A15
A13 https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/suppl/10.2105/AJPH.2015.303020/suppl_file/web+appendix+
r2.docx
A14 https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/24901
A15 Their estimate is likely conservative, as they do not incorporate how Community Care Centers affect reporting rates.
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